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INTRODUCTION
In waging the "war on terror," the United States (U.S.) has detained
numerous individuals for many years and claims the right to detain them for
their whole lives on the ground that they are dangerous. But the basis for this
claim of dangerousness is often flimsy hearsay testimony or similarly unreliable
evidence. Those who care about justice as well as security want to be sure that
those who are detained for long periods of time have either had a fair trial and
been convicted of a serious crime or, if they are being preventively detained,
then it is only because of reliable evidence-regularly reviewed-showing that
their release would pose an unacceptable risk to security. The following is a
constitutional argument for striking ajust balance between liberty and security,
one that is superior to the one struck by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) that currently determine whether captured individuals can be detained
as "enemy combatants."
The Bush administration has argued that there are no constitutional limits
on when it can detain nonresident aliens in the interest of security in the "war
on terror." This argument is based on a widespread misreading of Johnson v.
Eisentrager,' according to which the Supreme Court has "emphatically"
rejected the claim that nonresident aliens benefit from constitutional protections
of their liberty.2 We expose this misreading and argue that all persons detained
by the United States in the "war on terror" have rights under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. In particular, the fundamental protection the Fifth Amendment provides
for liberty-guaranteeing that it cannot be deprived without due process of
law-applies to all detainees, not only to citizens and resident aliens but also
to aliens captured and held by the United States outside the territory of the
United States.3
Furthermore, we contend that the law of war, as a part of international law,
provides substantive norms for distinguishing between different kinds of
detainees and determining the content of their due process rights.4 These
1. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
2. The claim that the rejection was "emphatic" was made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
3. A direct implication of this thesis is that CIA detentions ofaliens for interrogation purposes are
also covered by constitutional law, contrary to the view implicit in President Bush's Executive Order,
Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and
Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Exec. OrderNo. 13,440,72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July
20, 2007).
4. This position was recently taken in AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 2007), but
only with respect to resident aliens, as the court, we think wrongly, took the position that only resident aliens
benefit from constitutional rights.
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substantive norms show that CSRTs are inadequate in two fundamental regards.
First, they misapply to civilians concepts that are relevant to combatants,
including the idea of detention until "the cessation of active hostilities."
Second, they use standards for detention that strike the wrong balance between
claims of liberty and of security, allowing people to be detained on the basis of
flimsy evidence that does not reliably show that they are too dangerous to be
released.
These two claims are separate. The Court could decide that nonresident
aliens benefit from constitutional rights and decide not to look to international
law for guidance on the content of those rights. But were the Court to decide
that the law of war is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation, it would not
only be in error, but it would abandon the longstanding and deep connection
between constitutional law and international law.
Lastly, there is the question of how these rights could be vindicated. A
detainee may be able to press his claim for due process by invoking his
statutorily granted right to appeal the determination that he is an enemy
combatant. But if not, he must maintain the right of habeas corpus to contest
his unconstitutional detention. The Military Commissions Act of 2006' (MCA)
strips federal courts of their jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by detainees
in the "war on terror." The U.S. Constitution does not, however, allow the
stripping of habeas jurisdiction when that jurisdiction is necessary to protect
constitutional rights. The most recent court ruling on this point, Boumediene
v. Bush,6 gets this wrong by holding that nonresident alien detainees have no
constitutional rights. They not only have such rights, but if they cannot raise
these rights on appeal, then the right to habeas is guaranteed to them as a
subsidiary procedural right.
We develop our argument in six parts. In Parts I and II we give an
introductory overview of the U.S. practice of detentions in the "war on terror,"
and the Supreme Court's discussion of the practice in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.7 In
Part HI we critically discuss Hamdi's misapplication of the law of war and
provide the legal parameters of a detention policy consistent with the law of
war. In Part IV we argue for the extraterritorial applicability to nonresident
aliens of the core constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. In Part V we elucidate the link between constitutional norms
and international law. Finally, we argue that these rights can be enforced by
U.S. courts in Part VI.
5. 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006).
6. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
7. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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I. BACKGROUND ON DETENTION IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
The latest reports indicate that the United States now holds approximately
375 detainees from the "war on terror" in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba,'
approximately 620 in Afghanistan,9 and over 18, 000 in Iraq.'0 We focus on the
detainees in GuantAnamo, as there is little publicly available information on
those held elsewhere.l" We adopt this focus for illustrative purposes only, and
not as an indication that the rights of detainees are or should be fundamentally
different depending on where they are held.
Of the 375 or so detainees still in Guantdnamo, approximately eighty have
been determined to be eligible for release or transfer and will presumably be
released or transferred as the United States proceeds with negotiations with
other countries that would receive them.12 Since 2002, approximately 390
detainees have been released to other countries; 111 were released in 2006
alone. 3 This record of releasing detainees lends some support to the
Department of Defense's claim that "[t]he United States does not desire to hold
detainees for any longer than necessary."' 4
Nonetheless, there is still ground for concern. Even if the United States
releases all eighty detainees who have been determined eligible for release, it
8. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Detainee Transfer Announced (June 19,2007), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD= 11030 (last visited Sept. 11, 2007).
9. See Ben Fox, Ex-Guantdnamo Prisoner, Once Among Youngest Held, Back in US. Custody,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 18,2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/19/news/CB-GEN-
Guantanamo-Juvenile.php (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
10. See Walter Pincus, US. Holds 18,000 Detainees in Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2007, at A24
("The average stay in these detention centers is about a year, but about 8,000 of the detainees have been jailed
longer, including 1,300 who have been in custody for two years, said a statement provided by Capt. Phillip
J. Valenti, spokesman for Task Force 134, the U.S. Military Police group handling detainee operations.").
11. But see id.; Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet, Jailed 2 Years, Iraqi Tells of Abuse by
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at 1.1 (describing cases of an Iraqi detainee held in Iraq for over two
years, during which time he was questioned only once, and subjected to harsh, degrading treatment many
times); Omar ex rel. Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d. I (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the process given a United
States citizen detained in Iraq in a way that seems very much like a CSRT hearing).
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note 8; see also Sara Wood, Administrative
Tribunals to Begin for High- Value Guantanamo Detainees, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Mar. 6, 2007,
available at http:/www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2007/03/sec-070306-a fps01 .htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2007).
13. Wood, supra note 12. The countries to which prisoners have been released include "Albania,
Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Sudan,
Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, and Yemen." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note
8.
14. Wood, supra note 12.
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will still be holding approximately three hundred detainees in Guantdnamo, not
to mention the others held in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most likely elsewhere-
including those held by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Even assuming
that some others will be found eligible for release, hundreds (or thousands,
counting those held outside Guantinamo) could well be held in preventive
detention "for the duration of hostilities," which in the context of a "war on
terror" could be generations. Indeed, even if Guantdnamo is closed down, many
detainees would still be kept in long term preventive detention (presumably
now on U.S. soil), 5 and their constitutional rights would still be an issue.
It is true that every detainee in Guantdnamo has been found to be an
"enemy combatant" by a CSRT.'6 By itself, however, this is not very
reassuring. These determinations are structured to err on the side of detaining
those who were not "enemy combatants." A detainee has access to a "personal
representative" who can review the government's evidence and share with him
the unclassified portions thereof, but he does not have access to legal help. 7
The government's evidence can include anything the CSRT deems relevant,
including hearsay.'" Lastly, and most tellingly, a detainee is determined to be
an "enemy combatant" if that conclusion is supported by a "preponderance of
the evidence," and there is a rebuttable presumption that the U.S. government's
evidence is "genuine and accurate."' 9 In other words, if a detainee cannot rebut
the government's evidence, the government's evidence is taken to be sufficient.
In practice, the presumption that the U.S. government's evidence is
genuine and accurate may be very hard for a detainee to rebut effectively,
15. See Thorn Shanker& David Johnson, Legislation CouldBe Path to Closing Guantdnamo, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A10.
16. The foundations for CSRTs were laid in the Detainee Treatment Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1006
(2005) [hereinafter DTA]. "Between July 2004 and March 2005, [the Department of Defense] conducted 558
CSRTs at GuantAnamo Bay. At the time, thirty-eight detainees were determined to no longer meet the
definition of enemy combatant, and 520 detainees were found to be enemy combatants." Wood, supra note
12. As of October 2005, at the latest, the U.S. Government claimed that all detainees in Guantinamo Bay
had had their status reviewed by a CSRT. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Situation of Detainees at
Guantdnamo Bay, 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.120_.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
We do not know what percentage of detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq have likewise had (similar) status
review hearings.
17. See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Sec'y of the Military Dep't 4 (July 14,
2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRT Procedures.pdf (last visited
Sept. 24, 2007).
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
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leaving many "innocent" detainees unable to make their case."° Furthermore,
the affidavit of Stephen Abraham, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army
Reserve who served on a CSRT board, indicates that the problems inherent in
the design of CSRTs are made worse by inept and biased implementation of the
procedures."
Coming on the heels of Hamdi, where the Supreme Court found that
Hamdi had been detained as an enemy combatant without any opportunity to
contest the evidence, CSRTs are a real improvement. However, even
supplemented by an annual review, CSRTs cannot suffice to provide the
process due nonresident aliens before being preventively detained for years or
even decades.2" And it is important to keep in mind that detainees in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and possibly elsewhere, may get even less by way of
procedural protections. Moreover, CIA detainees seem to receive no process
at all.23
The inadequacies of the CSRTs--even if the procedures were flawlessly
executed-are really our focal concern. CSRTs operate as though the issue is
to determine whether the individuals who come in front of them are combatants
who may be preventively detained until the end of hostilities in an international
conflict. That is a mistaken framing of the issue. First, preventive detention
until the end of hostilities is premised on an international war. The "war on
terror" as a whole cannot be conceived of this way because it covers detentions
that occur where international war is ongoing and where it is not. Second,
treating all detainees as "combatants" confuses the relevant standards for
preventive detention of combatants and civilians. The process for preventively
detaining a civilian, when the context is not detention prior to trial, should
assess the evidence of his dangerousness so that his detention lasts no longer
than actually necessary to meet serious security needs. CSRTs do not weigh the
evidence with that question in view.
20. For illustration of this point, see Time Change-Examining Proposals to Limit Guantanamo
Detainees' Access to Habeas Corpus Review, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, (2006)
(statement of Thomas Sullivan, Partner, Jenner & Block), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfn?id=2416&wit id=5772 (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
21. See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at app., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 06-1196). Colonel Abraham declares that those charged with gathering
information for the CSRT boards seemed to be generally untrained and inexperienced in either legal or
intelligence matters; that the information available to them was incomplete; that access to information that
might have been exculpatory was denied him when he was officially tasked with finding it; and that CSRT
boards faced pressure from above not to find that someone was not an "enemy combatant." Id.
22. The Department of Defense reports that the detainees in Guanthinamo have had two annual
reviews, as of March 6, 2007. See Wood, supra note 12.
23. See Exec. Order No. 13,440, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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To see how these design problems arose, we turn now to an aspect of the
Hamdi decision that has so far received very little critical discussion-namely,
the way the Court seems to license indefinite and perhaps perpetual detention.
II. SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON DETENTION IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
The Court (by which we mean the plurality opinion) in Hamdi was
concerned with the possibility of perpetual detention. It addressed that concern
in three ways. First, it pointed out that one of the more objectionable reasons
for indefinite detention was not in play: "we agree that indefinite detention for
the purpose of interrogation is not authorized [by Congress in the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)].'24
Second, it embraced a competing justification for detention: "The purpose
of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of
battle and taking up arms once again. 25 Moreover, it framed its acceptance of
that purpose in terms of the internationally recognized norms of the law of war,
noting that "[i]t is a clearly established principle of the law of war that
detention may last no longer than active hostilities."26 Finding that "[a]ctive
combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in
Afghanistan, 27 and that the AUMFs grant of authority to the President to use
"necessary and appropriate force" included "the authority to detain [captured
individuals] for the duration of the relevant conflict,"2 it completed the
syllogism and concluded that the ongoing detentions of individuals caught
while fighting against the United States in Afghanistan are "part of the exercise
of necessary and appropriate force, and therefore are authorized by the
AUMF.' 29
Third, it offered future courts a potential escape hatch when it allowed that
its understanding "may unravel" if "the practical circumstances of a given
conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development
of the law of war."30 This difficult standard-being "entirely unlike" other
wars-was held not to apply at the present time. But it could allow arguments
24. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. Interestingly, this is in play with CIA detentions. It seems the only
reason President Bush believes he can order these is that they apply only to aliens, which he presumably
thinks benefit from no constitutional protections. As for why he thinks this is true of resident aliens, we
cannot hazard a guess.
25. Id. at 518.
26. Id. at 520-21.
27. Id. at 521.
28. Id.
29. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
30. Id
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to be made in the future that the "war on terror" has evolved in such a way that
future detentions should be viewed as more problematic than the ongoing
detention of captured combatants in a war that still involves active hostilities.3
It is important to be clear about the status of the Court's arguments here.
It might seem as if they were simply statutory arguments regarding what was
authorized by the AUMF. It is implausible, however, to suggest that the
Court's appeal to the law of war had no constitutional significance. When the
Court concluded that "[t]here is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own
citizens as an enemy combatant,"32 it surely was referring to constitutional as
well as statutory bars. Because the Constitution does not allow liberty to be
deprived except with due process of law-interpreted to involve both
procedural and substantive protections-the Court must have assumed that the
law of war is relevant to the constitutionally required due process. Indeed, if
we imagine that Congress had granted the President the right to hold captured
citizens both indefinitely and beyond the cessation of active hostilities, there
could be no doubt that the Court would have found this to be constitutionally
problematic. In other words, the citation to the law of war was not merely an
aid in statutory interpretation. If we are to make sense of the Court's opinion,
we have to see that citation as providing also a standard for constitutionally
acceptable detentions.33
Admittedly, the Hamdi Court's implicit reliance on constitutional rights
was deployed in a case involving a U.S. citizen. But our larger argument is that
the U.S. Constitution's protection against the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law applies to nonresident aliens as well as to resident aliens and
U.S. citizens. The process they are due may take into account the danger the
United States faces and the difficulties involved in collecting reliable evidence
of dangerousness, but it must also give due weight to their liberty interests.
We also acknowledge that it does not follow from the fact that the Court
looked to the law of war to justify preventive detentions in the "war on terror"
that it has to align constitutional law with the law of war. If the Court were to
accept our position that it misinterpreted the law of war, it could decide that the
law of war provides only a sufficient, not a necessary, basis for finding
preventive detentions in the "war on terror" to be constitutional. Nonetheless
31. It is also possible to interpret this third prong not as suggesting that the law of war might allow
too many to be detained for too long, but that it might not allow enough to be detained for as long as
necessary.
32. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
33. This is how the majority in Al-Marri reads Hamdi as well. In a footnote attached to a citation
to Hamdi it wrote that AI-Marri "is protected by the Due Process Clause and so cannot be seized and
indefinitely detained by the military unless he qualifies as an enemy combatant [under the law of war]." Al-
Marri, 487 F.3d at 181 n.10.
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we proceed on the assumption that the Court was deriving constitutional
authority from the law of war and that it would at least shift the burden onto the
administration to provide another justification for current detention practices
if it turns out that they are inconsistent with the law of war. In addition, we
argue in Part V that it would be proper, in developing a jurisprudence for due
process rights for nonresident aliens, for the Court to look to international law,
including the law of war.
Before moving on to a substantive criticism of the Hamdi decision, it is
important to be clear that the Court was indeed discussing the "war on terror"
generally, and not merely the limited part of it that was an international armed
conflict between the United States and the Taliban government of Afghanistan.
Given the fact that the evidence the Court offered of ongoing hostilities in the
"relevant conflict" was fighting in Afghanistan, and that it appealed to the law
of war to justify detentions, it might seem as though it was addressing only
detentions in traditional international armed conflicts.34 Were that the case, our
criticism of the decision would be misplaced.
But there are two reasons why it is hard to read the opinion that narrowly.
First, the Court's concern with the danger of "perpetual detention" cannot be
made sense of in the context of traditional international conflicts. Such
conflicts do not raise the specter of an "unconventional war" that could last "for
two generations," in which a detainee like Hamdi might be detained "for the
rest of his life."35 To raise that specter, the Court had to invoke not the war in
Afghanistan, but the larger "war on terror." Second, the Court was fundament-
ally concerned with the President's authorization under the AUMF, which was
broadly directed at "'nations, organizations, or persons' associated with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."36 In other words, the AUMF lumped
together combatants such as the Taliban soldiers and noncombatants-such as
members of al Qaeda-and the Court seemed to follow along, using the term
"enemy combatant" to cover both. Moreover, the CSRTs created in the wake
of Hamdi apply to both, without distinction.
In the end, it is not completely clear whether the Hamdi Court was
discussing the larger "war on terror" or only the war in Afghanistan. It is clear,
however, that in establishing CSRTs the Bush Administration reads Hamdi as
34. This is how the majority in AI-Marri reads Hamdi. Id. at 178-79.
35. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. Of course there was the 100 Year War between France and England,
but it is hard to imagine the war in Afghanistan itself lasting anything like that long. In fact, there is a sense
in which that international war is already over because the Karzai government is not fighting the United
States and the United States is no longer an occupying power. Now the United States is merely helping the
Karzai government fight an insurgency, an example of a non-international armed conflict.
36. Id. at 518.
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relevant to the larger "war on terror." We discuss the opinion below as though
that were the correct reading. And on that reading-in treating this larger
"war" as though any putative terrorist detained in it would properly be
categorized as an "enemy combatant"-the Court departed substantially from
the law of war. We now turn to explaining why that is so.
III. CRITICIZING THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF DETAINEE RIGHTS
UNDER THE LAW OF WAR
37
The Court made two basic mistakes in invoking the law of war to justify
indefinite, possibly perpetual, preventive detention in the "war on terror." First,
it failed to see that the cessation of "active hostilities" does not fit the "war on
terror" as a whole. Second, it failed to see that the detainees captured in the
"war on terror" are usually not combatants, but are instead civilians. If we
correct these errors we see that legal detentions generally require more than
CSRT hearings. We also see that the law of war, as it now stands, can
reasonably be applied even given the new threats raised by terrorism.
A. Misapplication of the Norms of International Armed Conflict: The
Cessation ofActive Hostilities
The Court appealed to the cessation of "active hostilities" for setting a
limit to the length of detentions in the "war on terror." In so doing, the Court
relied on a part of the law of war that deals with international armed conflict.
However, the notion of the cessation of active hostilities does not fit the "war
on terror" as a whole, as the "war on terror" extends beyond any international
war that may form part of it.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto
provide the modern statements of the law of war with regard to the treatment
and justification of detention of those interned during war. In particular, the
Third and Fourth Convention (GC III and GC IV respectively), together with
the Additional Protocol I (AP I), provide the law governing the detention of
prisoners of war and other detainees.38
37. To speak with the Supreme Court, we use the phrase "law of war" where many authors would
instead use "laws of armed conflict."
38. These are, respectively, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC 1M]; Geneva Convention Relative to Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV];
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP 1]. The United States is a
signatory of these Geneva Conventions, but not the AP I. Nevertheless, the articles of the AP I that we rely
on, notably art. 75 on minimum guarantees, are generally regarded as customary international law. See
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The Supreme Court cited GC III, Article 118, for the proposition that
"detention may last no longer than active hostilities."39 This provision is only
triggered under Common Article 2, which provides that certain provisions of
law are applicable to "cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them"; and "cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance." ' Because the Geneva
Conventions are customary international law, the reference to high contracting
parties can be replaced with a reference to states. This shows that the reference
to "active hostilities" is limited to wars between states.
The Geneva Conventions also apply, in Common Article 3, to non-
international armed conflicts, such as wars between a state and groups such as
the Taliban after they were removed from power and became a rebel group.
But Common Article 3 provides minimum standards for humane treatment and
fair trial;4 it does not discuss when detentions are legally justified. It is only
in the law triggered by Common Article 2 that one finds provisions justifying
detention, and, as just noted, Common Article 2 refers to instances of
international armed conflict.
The Court was right to think that the conflict in Afghanistan counted as an
international armed conflict. The problem with the Court's analysis is that it
can be read as though the law of warjustified detention that could go on as long
as the "war on terror" lasts. Since much of the "war on terror" extends beyond
such international armed conflicts, however, the appeal to GC III cannot
possibly justify detentions until the end of the "war on terror." Indeed, since
appeal to the cessation of "active hostilities" was designed to fit the context of
a war between states, using it in another context strips it from its normative
foundation. Moreover, the notion of "active hostilities" loses its meaning if
taken from the context of a conflict between states and used instead to refer to
Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International
Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 419, 427
(1987) ("We support in particular the fundamental guarantees contained in article 75"); William H. Taft, The
Law ofArmed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003) ("While the
United States has major objections to parts of Additional Protocol I, it does regard the provisions of Article
75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.").
39. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
40. GC Il, supra note 38, art. 2; GC IV, supra note 38, art. 2, IN 1-2. This was also adopted by
reference in AP I, art. 1, 3 ("This Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situations referred to in Article 2 common to those
Conventions.").
41. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
2007]
56 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 14:1
ongoing acts of terrorism and the United States's ongoing efforts to combat
them.42
It might be suggested that the "war on terror" presents a new set of
problems and that the old law has to be adapted to these new problems.
Perhaps-but extensions of the Geneva Conventions have to make sense and
appealing to the cessation of active hostilities is a categorical confusion. If
civilians who are members of certain terrorist groups are especially dangerous,
then it is the provisions dealing with the detention of civilians, not those dealing
with the return of combatants after an international armed conflict, that should
be re-examined.
We turn now to the second confusion: treating detainees in the "war on
terror" as if they were combatants.
B. Misapplication of the Norms of International Armed Conflict: Confusing
Civilians and Combatants
A second mistake in the Court's reasoning in Hamdi was to treat the
detainees in the "war on terror" as though they were combatants. There
presumably were some combatants captured in the wars against Afghanistan
and Iraq. Indeed, if the government's position on Hamdi is factually accurate,
he may well have been a combatant.43 But the opinion seems to be general, and
those captured in the "war on terror" during non-international armed conflicts,
such as the current fight against the Taliban, are not combatants. 44 Terrorists
42. We do not mean to imply that the law regarding when active hostilities have ceased, even in
the context of international armed conflict, is entirely clear. A good sense for the problem can be gained by
comparing the majority and the dissenting opinions in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
43. The government relied on a declaration by Michael Mobbs, according to which
Hamdi was 'affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons training'...
,remained with his Taliban unit following the attacks of September 11' . .. during the
time when Northern Alliance forces were 'engaged in battle with the Taliban,'
'Hamdi's Taliban unit surrendered' to those forces, after which he 'surrender[ed] his
Kalishnikov assault rifle' to them.
Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs at 3-4, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No.
2:02CV439). If the United States was in overall control over the Northern Alliance at this time, then the
conflict would have been international, and Hamdi would count as a combatant. Hamdi, however, claims
to have been a civilian in Afghanistan doing relief work. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511.
44. Note that the category of "combatants" exists only in international armed conflicts and not in
non-international armed conflicts. Thejustification for this becomes intuitively clear when one considers that
only combatants are immunized from prosecution for legal acts of war which would otherwise constitute a
crime. Others may be retrospectively granted amnesty in a non-international context, but that should not be
confused with an immunity. See Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict art. 6, 5, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP H].
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in general are civilians. The point here is not the one that Hamdi himself was
making-that he was a civilian, in no way engaged in hostilities, mistakenly
taken to be a combatant. The point is that even those who were engaged in
hostilities were mostly doing so as civilians. And the rules for detaining and
releasing civilians are not the same as those for detaining and releasing
combatants.
The definitions of civilians and combatants are laid out in AP I, which
codifies a negative definition of civilians as those who are not combatants. "A
civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons
referred to in Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in
Article 43 of this Protocol., 45  There are a few things worth highlighting in
these provisions. First, with one exception, all combatants must be linked to a
Party, in other words, a signatory state. 46 Second, the reason for this require-
ment is that combatants are privileged to engage in hostilities; they may legally
kill and otherwise perform legal acts of war that civilians may not perform.47
Individuals can benefit from such a privilege if and only if they are properly
connected with a Party that confers the right to engage in hostilities on them.48
Third, the definitions are exhaustive. A civilian is anyone who is not a
combatant.49 Fourth, terrorists who operate through organizations such as
45. AP I, supra note 38, art. 50, 1.
46. The exception is GC Ill, article 4(A), paragraph 6, which endorses the concept of levie en
masse, a spontaneous rise of the people in self-defense against the invading army. GC I, supra note 38, art.
4(a), 6.
47. The right to engage in hostilities is explicitly mentioned at the end of AP I, article 43, paragraph
2. AP I, supra note 38, art. 43, 2. See also Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict
and the Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9 (2004) ("The underlying theory of the
combatant's privilege is that wars are conflicts between public entities, not between individuals. The
detention of combatants is not punishment, but rather, simply a way of putting combatants hors de combat
for the duration of the conflict. Privileged combatants cannot be prosecuted for engaging in violence when
that violence complies with the rules regarding conduct of combat."). DIETER FLECK, THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 67 (1995) ("[O]n the basis of the ordinary meaning, a combatant
is a person who fights. As an international legal term, the combatant is a person who is authorized by
international law to fight in accordance with international law applicable in international armed conflict.").
48. See, e.g., KENNETH WATKIN, WARRIORS WITHOUT RIGHTS? COMBATANTS, UNPRIVILEGED
BELLIGERENTS, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGITIMACY 12 (2005) ("Combatancy is assessed in terms of
... its intimate and continuing link to legitimacy.").
49. The exhaustive nature of the distinction is generally accepted. See Knut D6rmann, The Legal
Situation of"Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants," 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 45, 45-46 (2003); Oscar M.
Uhler et al., Commentary, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
51 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans.) (1958) ("There is no intermediate status;
nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law."); HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel
v. The Government of Israel [2006] 26, available at http://elyonl.court.gov.ilFilesENG/02/690/007/
a34/02007690.a34.HTM (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) ("That definition [of civilians] is 'negative' in nature.
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al Qaeda, or who operate on their own, are civilians. These organizations do
not have a link to Parties to the conflict. This last point bears repeating: the
terrorists who are the target detainees in the "war on terror" are generally
civilians under the governing law of war.
Despite the fact that the distinction between civilians and combatants is
reasonably clear in the law of war, the Supreme Court misapplied it. As was
noted above, the Supreme Court cited GC I, Article 118, for the proposition
that "detention may last no longer than active hostilities."5  What Article 118
actually says is that "[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities."'" The term "prisoners of war"
applies only to captured combatants and certain limited classes of civilians-
generally those who accompany armed forces that belong to a party in the
conflict, not those who strike out on their own.52 Thus, while the Supreme
Court may have been right to cite this clause for someone like Hamdi who-if
the government is factually correct-may have been a combatant, it was wrong
insofar as it cited it for preventive detentions generally. Those detained or
interned as civilians generally are not covered under that release or repatriation
clause.
The preventive detention of civilians in time of occupation-the condition
that applied in Afghanistan at the time of Hamdi-is covered most directly by
GC IV, Article 78: "[i]f the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for
imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected
persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to
internment."" What is noteworthy here is how high the barrier to detention is.
It defines the concept of 'civilian' as the opposite of 'combatant."); Id. at M 27-28 ("the state asked us to
recognize a third category of persons, that of unlawful combatants.... [A]s far as existing law goes, the data
before us is not sufficient to recognize this third category."). See also Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-
14-T, Judgment, 180 (Mar. 3, 2000) ("[civilians are persons] who are not, or no longer, members of the
armed forces.").
50. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
51. Naturally, "[p]risoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an indictable offence are
pending may be detained until the end of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion of the
punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war already convicted for an indictable offence." GC I1,
supra note 38, art. 119.
52. A general six-item list of types of people who can become prisoners of war if captured is given
in GC In, article 4(A). GC III, supra note 38, art. 4(A). Paragraphs 4-6 concern specific categories of
civilians who are due the protections of prisoners of war. Id. The one exception to the claim that citizens can
become prisoners of war only if they accompany armed forces of a party to a conflict concerns the concept
of levie en masse. See supra note 46. Whether these civilians should also be treated as combatants with
regard to release conditions is a question we do not address here.
53. GC IV, supra note 38, art. 78, 1. AP I, article 75, paragraph 3 reinforces this GC IV passage,
but adds nothing new with regard to when a detainee must be released: "Except in cases of arrest or detention
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The emphasis on using preventive detention only rarely is sounded three times:
only when it is "necessary"; "for imperative reasons of security"; "at the most."
As the official commentary to this passage states, the point of the language used
was to ensure that "such measures can only be ordered for real and imperative
reasons of security; their exceptional character must be preserved."54 We will
see in section D at the end of this Part, that this approach to preventive deten-
tion as exceptional conflicts with the use of CSRTs as currently configured.
The other relevant Article of GC IV, Article 133, may seem to link the
detention of civilians with that of combatants. It reads: "[i]nternment shall
cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities." But it should be noted
that this does not imply that internment during hostilities is as unproblematic
for civilians as it is for prisoners of war and other detained combatants. This
article is based on the premise that "hostilities are the main cause for
internment";" accordingly when they cease, it can be generally presumed that
the need for preventive detention will cease as well. Rather than implying that
civilians can be detained as long as combatants, it provides simply another limit
to the detention of civilians. This is clear from GC IV Article 132, which states
that "[e]ach interned person shall be released... as soon as the reasons which
necessitated his internment no longer exist."
These provisions show that the Hamdi Court misapplied the law insofar
as it approved of holding "enemy combatants" until the cessation of "active
hostilities" on the grounds that this is in accordance with the law of war. Most
of these "enemy combatants" are not combatants at all. They are civilians and
their detention until the cessation of active hostilities is not straightforwardly
authorized by the law of war.
The U.S. government has tried to resist this conclusion by taking the
position that those civilians who engage in hostilities turn into a species of
combatant-unlawful enemy combatants.56 This can be seen, for example, in
for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon
as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist." AP I, supra note 38,
art. 75, 3. This provision of AP I serves as an ultimate safety net for persons who are not covered by the
relevant parts of GC IV because they do not qualify as "protected persons" as defined in GC TV, article 4.
54. Uhler, supra note 49, at 368. See also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21 -A, Judgment,
320 (Feb. 20, 2000) ("The judicial or administrative body reviewing the decision of a party to a conflict to
detain an individual must bear in mind that such measures of detention should only be taken if absolutely
necessary for reasons of security.... [T]he involuntary confinement of a civilian where the security of the
Detaining Power does not make this absolutely necessary will be unlawful.").
55. Uhler, supra note 49, at 515.
56. There are also scholars who adopt this line. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 28 (2004) ("A civilian may convert
himself into a combatant."). The assumption that an individual could individually gain combatant status
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the remarks of the Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, John B.
Bellinger: "it's very clear, and an accepted [sic] in international law, that
individuals who take up arms illegally ... are combatants because they are
fighting, but they are 'unlawful combatants' because they are doing it in an
illegal way."57 Plausible as his claim may sound in terms of lay English, it is,
as we have seen, simply and straightforwardly wrong as an account of inter-
national law."
Again, there may be reason to amend the law of war when it comes to the
detention of civilians. We return to examine that possibility in section E of this
Part. Our point now is that by treating civilians as combatants, the Court did
not respect the law of war as it now stands.
C. The Law of War and International Human Rights Law
So far we have been discussing only the limits on detention provided by
the law of war as it deals with international armed conflict. But that leaves
much of the "war on terror" ungoverned by international law. It might be
thought, then, that the right way to get guidance from international law on
detentions in the "war on terror," especially when it is waged outside of the
context of international armed conflict, is to look to international human rights
law. Perhaps surprisingly, this would not yield much guidance, as it turns out
that international law is more lax when it comes to preventive detention outside
the context of international armed conflict than in it. However, an argument
can still be made that the law of war for international armed conflict presents
a basic floor for legal detentions.
according to his actions is also implicit in Eric Talbot Jensen, Combatant Status: It is TimeforIntermediate
Levels of Recognition for Partial Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 209 (2005).
57. John B. Bellinger HI, Digital Video Press Conference (Mar. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.usembassy.de/germany/bellingerdvc.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2007).
58. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. The Hamdi Court cites Ex Parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 31 (1942), hoping thereby to show that the "capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants" is
legally well grounded. 542 U.S. at 518. But there is no reason to take Quirin as precedent for treating
civilians who unlawfully use force as combatants in the modem, legal sense of the word. See also Al-Marri,
487 F.3d at 186 ("[M]erely engaging in unlawful behavior does not make one an enemy combatant.... The
Quirin petitioners were first enemy combatants associating themselves with the military arm of the German
government with which the United States was at war.").
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When a state of international armed conflict does not exist, 59 the most
pertinent and universally applicable human rights law is the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).60 The relevant language for
our discussion from the ICCPR is found in Article 9:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law ....
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order
his release if the detention is not lawful.6'
While these clauses provide meaningful procedural protection, they do not
provide any substantive guidance on when a state can take a concern for
security to provide the basis for preventive detention. The prohibition on
arbitrary detention would not restrict the use of CSRTs to license preventive
detentions. Such detentions would certainly count as being in accordance with
a procedure established by law (the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and
the regulations promulgated pursuant to it, to be precise).62
Paragraph 4, which requires that there be some form of review by a court,
may provide some ground to criticize the use of CSRTs, but not a significant
one. The DTA provides for the right to appeal a CSRT finding that an
individual is an "enemy combatant," first to the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia, and from there to the U.S. Supreme Court.63 It could be argued
that the appeal right is too limited and that detainees also need to have a right
59. The only provision of the law of war that applies after wars and occupations end, but not
generally in peacetime as well as war is AP I, article 75, paragraph 6: "Persons who are arrested, detained
or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article until
their final release, repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict." AP I, supra note
38, art. 75, 6. Note also that only selected provisions of GC IV cover for the length of an occupation; others
end one year after "general close of military operations." GC IV, supra note 38, art. 6. Articles 78, 132 and
133, which we have discussed above, are among those that last only a year after the close of military
operations. AP , article 3(b) eliminates this one-year restriction, but the United States is not a signatory to
the AP I. AP I, supra note 38, art. 3(b).
60. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
61. Id. art. 9, 1, 4.
62. See supra notes 16-17.
63. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A).
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to habeas.' But unless there were some substantive legal problem with the
sorts of preventive detentions that the United States is now using in the "war on
terror," the procedural right to habeas would be of limited value. It might allow
certain factual inquiries that could not be raised on appeal. But the right to
habeas, by itself, would not provide a ground to challenge the legal framework
for preventive detentions. For that, more substantive standards are needed.
Nevertheless, it would be quite anomalous if the United States were to
conclude that it has greater legal liberty to put nonresident aliens in possibly
perpetual preventive detention if it captures them after a period of occupation
of another country ends than if it captures them during a period of occupation.6"
The solution to this anomaly is to be found in the link that should be made
between the law of war and U.S. constitutional law. Our argument in the next
two Parts will be that nonresident aliens benefit from the Constitution's
prohibition on deprivations of liberty without due process of law (again,
understood to have both substantive and procedural dimensions) (Part IV), and
that the law of war provides substantive guidance on how to interpret this
constitutional norm for the case of nonresident aliens (Part V). The standards
deployed in the Geneva Conventions provide an appropriate baseline for
balancing the United States' legitimate concern with security against the rights
of individuals to their liberty. The fact that international human rights law does
not provide a similar baseline does not give the United States license to change
the balance between its security interests and liberty interests of individuals.
It is not as if international human rights law provides competing norms for
balancing state security interests against individual liberty interests when
international armed conflicts are not ongoing. International human rights law
simply does not address in any substantial way the balance. Thus, the only
substantive guidance from international law comes from the law of war. If the
balance between security and liberty is appropriately struck in the Geneva
Conventions, then that is the proper constitutional balance for dealing with
nonresident aliens.
D. The Conflict Between U.S. Policy and the International Law Standard for
Balancing Security and Liberty
Even if the Supreme Court did not properly describe the law of war in
Hamdi, it might be argued that CSRTs strike-or would strike if staffed by well
64. This is the argument the Court decided to entertain when it granted certiorari, after initially
denying it in the Boumediene case. Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981.
65. The period of occupation would count as a period of international armed conflict.
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trained individuals who had access to the intelligence they need66-a legally
justifiable balance between the security interests of the United States and the
liberty interests of detainees. We argue here for the contrary position.
As noted above, GC IV provides that when a state "considers it necessary,
for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected
persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to
internment. 67  The balance struck here allows for only minimal use of
preventive detention, and only in exceptional cases. Nonetheless, it is a balance
that is called for and thus, security concerns can, if serious enough, justify
preventive detentions.68
The United States may claim that the CSRT procedure provides just this
sort of balance.69 Ongoing preventive detention is allowed only after a CSRT
has determined by a preponderance of the evidence that those detained are
"enemy combatants" in the functional sense of individuals who have taken up
arms against the United States and its allies.7" This is a determination based on
an individualized hearing. Moreover, a holding that a detainee is an "enemy
combatant" is reviewed on an annual basis.71
But there are at least three problems with the CSRT procedures. 72 First,
a preponderance of the evidence is a comparative notion; it does not imply that
the evidence is particularly strong. A preponderance of the evidence could be
66. See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 21.
67. GC IV, supra note 38, art. 78, 11.
68. If security can be preserved relatively well with less drastic measures than internment, then
those less drastic measures must be taken. For example, the practice of releasing detainees if they can come
up with a reliable "sponsor" within the community provides a way of protecting security while also promoting
liberty. The existence of this practice was pointed out to us by Charles Garraway. See also Bremer: Iraq
detainees to be freed(Jan. 7,2004), available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/O1/07/sprj.nirq.
bremer/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). In any event, the only legitimate factor counterbalancing the
deprivation of liberty is individual dangerousness constituting a security risk. Notably, this excludes
detention for the purpose of gathering information, which would be illegal in all circumstances. Cf Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 521.
69. This may only be true of detainees in Guantnamo, as the CSRT regulations we have been
discussing apply only there. The DTA does call for status review procedures to be developed for Afghanistan
and Iraq as well. DTA § 1005(a). But we are uncertain how much they resemble the procedures for
Guantinamo. Importantly, the DTA covers detainees only in Guantinamo, Afghanistan or Iraq. If the United
States holds detainees elsewhere, those detainees are not covered by the DTA.
70. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
71. See DTA § 1005(a)(I)(A). Interestingly, the DTA has different clauses covering detainees in
GuantAnamo, on the one hand, and in Afghanistan and Iraq, on the other. The procedure for annual review
is only to be found in the clause covering Guanthnamo. Compare § 1005(a)(1)(A) and § 1005(a)(1)(B).
72. For further discussion of how limited and problematic CSRTs are see Boumediene, 476 F.3d
at 1005-06 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
20071
64 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
one piece of hearsay evidence from a dubious source, as compared to nothing
but the detainee's own denials on the other side. This problem is exacerbated
by the fact that CSRTs use a rebuttable presumption that the U.S. government's
evidence is "genuine and accurate."73
Second, though initial hearings are individualized, further review of
detention decisions are not, at least not in the relevant way, individualized. If
someone is found to be an "enemy combatant," he is subject to detention until
the cessation of "active hostilities," which in the war on terror would seem to
mean until the United States is no longer concerned about terrorist attacks.
Even with an annual review of his case, the presumption, once an individual is
declared an "enemy combatant," is that he can be held as long as the "war on
terror" goes on. The kind of individual consideration contemplated by the
Geneva Conventions, however, involves more than an annual review to see if
new facts have surfaced showing that his detention was a mistake.74 It requires
an individualized assessment of just how great a risk an individual poses, to
ensure that he is held no longer than necessary for "imperative reasons of
security."
Third, the definition of an "enemy combatant" is not only misleading, as
most detainees in the "war on terror" are civilians, but is also not particularly
tightly tied to a showing of dangerousness. The MCA defines an "unlawful
enemy combatant,"-a narrower category than the "enemy combatant" category
CSRTs use-in part, as "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or
its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person
who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)."75 Merely providing
"material support" for hostilities against the United States is an awfully
expansive term that may have nothing to do with being a supporter of terrorism.
It might be met, for example, by someone who, from time to time, cooks food
for members of terrorist organizations. Moreover, it is not clear what falls
under the label of forces "associated" with the Taliban and al Qaeda. Would
a member of Hamas, which has been declared a terrorist organization, count?
A huge percentage of the population of the Gaza strip could then be indefinitely
73. See Deputy Secretary of Defense, supra note 17.
74. Indeed, an annual review is insufficient. GC IV, article 43 provides that such revision shall take
place "periodically, and at least twice yearly." GC IV, supra note 38, art. 43. Also, in the context of
occupation, this decision must be reviewed periodically, "if possible every six months." Id. at 2.
75. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C § 948(a)(l)(A)(i)(emphasis added) [hereinafter MCA].
The CIA can detain for interrogation an even broader class of aliens, those who the Director of the CIA
determines "to be a member or part of or supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated organizations." See
Exec. Order No. 13,440, supra note 3 and accompanying text. Taken literally, the CIA could indefinitely
detain any alien who has done nothing more than express support for the Taliban.
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detained, even though many of them think of Hamas as a political party, not a
terrorist organization.76
To follow the norms of international law, then, the United States would
need to adopt different procedures that reflect a balance between security and
liberty that is more respectful of the claims of liberty. This does not mean that
the United States has to sacrifice its legitimate security interests. Measures
necessary to protect its security can legally be taken under international law.
However, it is a violation of international law to treat civilians like combatants
who can be detained until the "war on terror" is either "won" or abandoned.
E. Defense of the International Law Standard for Balancing Security and
Liberty
It might be argued, given the exigencies of the "war on terror," that the
United States is right to push for changes in the law of war. In particular, it
might be argued that the United States is right to push for a functional
definition, rather than a status definition, of combatants. According to the
functional definition, anyone who fights is a combatant. According to the status
definition, anyone who is entitled to fight is a combatant. The law of war uses
the status definition and we argue here that doing so strikes at least a defensible
balance between the security interests of the United States and the liberty
interests of detainees. The burden for changing the law of war, therefore, sits
squarely on those who seek to change it.
The premise underlying the United States' push to use the functional
definition is that members of groups like al Qaeda fight like combatants. They
present a danger more like that presented by combatants fighting for another
country than that presented by normal criminal activity (even organized
criminal activity). In addition, the problems of obtaining evidence sufficient to
convict them of criminal activity are so great that they need to be preventively
detained. They need to be detained, as combatants are detained, until the fight
against the organizations to which they belong is over.
These empirical claims are bolstered by a simple thought experiment.77
Suppose a combatant, fighting for a state with which the United States is at war,
and a civilian member of al Qaeda are captured side by side, both carrying
weapons, both having been shooting at U.S. troops. According to the law of
76. "[T]he mere fact that a person is a national of, or aligned with, an enemy party cannot be
considered as threatening the security of the opposing party where he is living and is not, therefore, a valid
reason for interning him or placing him in assigned residence." Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2 l-T,
Judgment, 577 (Nov. 16, 1998).
77. See Charles Garraway, "Combatants "-Substance or Semantics?" in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 317, 329-32 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
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war, the combatant can be detained until the cessation of hostilities with the
country for which he fights, but the civilian can be detained only as long as his
individual detention is necessary for imperative reasons of security. Moreover,
the combatant's detention does not have to be reviewed at all once he is
determined to be a combatant; by contrast, the civilian's status has to be
reviewed every six months.7" But surely it is absurd to treat the civilian, who
had no privilege to fight at all, so much better than the combatant. If he fights
like a combatant, he should be detained like one.
In response we point out that it is necessary to divide civilians who are
thought to function like combatants into two categories: those who are caught
red-handed and those who are not. Any civilian caught engaging in combat
would be caught engaging in a serious crime. He can presumably be convicted
and detained for as long as the relevant sentence allowed. Thus, he is actually
more subject to detention than a person with the status of combatant. On the
other hand, if a civilian is not caught red-handed, then there is likely to be some
doubt that he is a combatant and a danger that he will be detained without
cause. This danger of wrongly detaining someone who is not a combatant is
much less likely to be present with combatants who, in order to act lawfully,
must be wearing a distinctive insignia.79 Thus, the thought experiment does not
apply accurately to either category.
It might be objected that it is not always possible to prosecute those caught
red-handed. Capture in conditions of combat is a messy business and it is not
always possible for those who did the capturing to participate in a subsequent
trial. Indeed, sometimes the people who were eyewitnesses to a capture have
been killed in subsequent combat themselves. Moreover, whether or not they
are available for trial, they may have had little opportunity in the confusion of
real combat, to make extensive notes about who they captured and what they
were doing. If civilians had to be released as soon as it is no longer necessary
to detain them for imperative reasons of security, then the civilians who cannot
be tried because of a paucity of evidence might be released earlier than they
should be.
In response we point out that these are exactly the sorts of civilians who
can justifiably be preventively detained. We do not deny that many detainees
in the "war on terror" are committed to fighting the United States and to using
78. See GC IV, supra note 38, arts. 43 & 78, 2.
79. Any combatant not wearing distinctive insignia is guilty of a war crime. More significantly for
our point, we assume that it is very unlikely that anyone who is not a combatant would be wearing the
uniform or insignia of a combatant, especially as doing so would not only probably subject him to detention
until the cessation of hostilities, but also would mark him as a target for the enemy who, without knowing
better, is likely to shoot at the civilian in combatant's clothes.
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terrorist means in doing so. A category of preventive detention is justified for
those civilians for whom: a) there is insufficient evidence to obtain a
conviction for criminal actions, and yet b) there is good reason to believe that
they are terrorists, and c) no less restrictive treatment would serve the security
interests of the United States and its allies."0 Their cases may have to be
reviewed regularly, in contrast with what is due captured combatants. But they
can still be detained as long as there is good reason to believe that their ongoing
detention is imperative for security reasons, in other words, that they are still
a real threat. And regular review of their cases is a relatively small price to pay
to ensure that those who might have mistakenly been picked up as being
terrorists are released as soon as possible.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION TO NONRESIDENT ALIENS OF THE
CORE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT To BE DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
We now turn to the question of whether nonresident aliens can benefit
from the argument in Part MI as a matter of constitutional law.
A. Rasul v. Bush: ' A Headcount
When the Supreme Court most recently addressed the question whether
nonresident aliens have enforceable constitutional rights, 2 six of the nine
Justices took the position that they do. Five took that position in footnote
fifteen in the majority opinion of Rasul, and one, Justice Kennedy, took it in the
text of his concurring opinion. Even though one of the five who signed onto the
majority opinion, Justice O'Connor, has since retired, there should still be at
least five members of the Court who embrace the position that nonresident
aliens have constitutional rights.8 3
Starting then with footnote fifteen, it reads:
Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in
combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have
been held in Executive detention for more than two years in territory
80. Civilians can also be detained in the short run while looking for a country that would not violate
their human rights. See, e.g., Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198, 199 (D.D.C. 2005).
81. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
82. It is not redundant to describe constitutional rights as enforceable. For brevity, however, we
assume that all constitutional rights are enforceable.
83. We draw no inferences from the initial denial of certiorari in Boumediene, nor from the Court's
subsequent decision to grant certiorari.
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subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
United States, without access to counsel and without being charged
with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe 'custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'8 4
This text indicates that nonresident aliens could be subject to treatment by the
United States that would normally justify granting the writ of habeas: "custody
in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States. '5 By
itself, this does not imply that it is their constitutional rights that have been
violated-there are two other possibilities: violations of the law or treaties of
the United States. Yet the citation the Court offers for this claim does implicate
constitutional rights.
The supporting citation is Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,86 and the cases cited therein. Verdugo-Urquidez
held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
does not extend to nonresident aliens whose property outside the United States
is searched by U.S. authorities. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion rejected
the thought that the holding followed from the general proposition that
nonresident aliens have no constitutional rights. Instead, he framed the
question as "what constitutional standards apply when the Government acts, in
reference to an alien, within its sphere of foreign operations."87 In so framing
the question, he extended a point Justice Harlan had made concurring in Reid
v. Covert:88 It is "not that the Constitution 'does not apply' overseas, but that
there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all
circumstances in every foreign place."89 Justice Harlan's point concerned only
U.S. citizens; by citing it in this case, however, Kennedy was extending it to
aliens as well. Thus, the Rasul majority's citing this opinion makes it clear that
they agreed that constitutional rights could apply to nonresident aliens.
Justice Kennedy's own opinion in Rasul focused on the constitutional right
to habeas, as originally discussed in Eisentrager. The Court in Eisentrager
denied that twenty-one German detainees, who had been convicted of war
crimes by a military commission in China and who were later repatriated to
84. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
85. This phrase comes from the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2007). We say
"normally" because the MCA has stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over these detainees.
86. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259.
87. Id. at 277.
88. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).




Germany to serve their sentences in an American army base prison, had a right
to contest their detentions using habeas corpus. Nonetheless, it endorsed the
view that the constitutionally guaranteed right to habeas "is a subsidiary
procedural right that follows from possession of substantive constitutional
rights."9 Thus, to find that the detainees in Guantinamo had a constitutional
right to habeas, Justice Kennedy had to first find that they had constitutional
rights that might be violated by their custody in Guantdnamo. He found that
was the case both because "Guantinamo Bay is in every practical respect a
United States territory,"'" and because "the detainees at Guantinamo Bay are
being held indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceeding to
determine their status. 92 The important point, then, is that Kennedy, relying
on Eisentrager, came down again, consistently with his opinion in Verdugo-
Urquidez, in favor of nonresident aliens having constitutional rights that the
United States could violate.
It must be observed that both the majority and Justice Kennedy concurring
in Rasul expressed the view that nonresident aliens can benefit from
constitutional rights only when brought to U.S. territory, or at least territory that
is "subject to the long term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United
States."93 Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez was not in the
same way tied to United States controlled territory and that provides some
reason to think that the majority would extend constitutional rights to aliens
held by the United States outside territory controlled by the United States. But
just how the remaining members of the Rasul majority and Kennedy would
handle extending constitutional rights to nonresident aliens held by the United
States outside of territory controlled by the United States cannot be predicted
with great confidence.
B. The Case Law: An Open Question
We argue in this section that there is no settled case law on whether
nonresident aliens benefit from constitutional rights. In the next section, we
argue that because the Court confronts a choice between two different policies
the only honest approach to the choice is to examine the underlying reasons.
There are many voices in the debate that take the view that the law is
already clear: constitutional protections do not extend to nonresident aliens.
90. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781.
91. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487.
92. Id. at 487-88. In 2004, detainees did benefit from no legal process, as the CSRTs had not yet
been established. It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy would consider the process they provide adequate
to meet his concerns.
93. Id. at 484.
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For example, in Boumediene the majority declared: "[p]recedent in ... the
Supreme Court holds that the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens
without property or presence within the United States."" a There are two
Supreme Court cases that are primarily relied on for the view that nonresident
aliens have no constitutional rights. In reverse chronological order they are
Verdugo- Urquidez and Eisentrager. We address these in turn.
The majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, claimed that aliens outside the United States or territory controlled
by the United States do not benefit from any constitutional rights. The first
thing to note about this opinion is that it was not a majority opinionfor that
claim. Justice Kennedy was one of the five who signed on to the opinion, but
in his concurring opinion he stated: "I do not mean to imply, and the Court has
not decided, that persons in the position of the respondent have no
constitutional protection."95 He took this position in part because he thought
that the stronger claim in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, that aliens benefit from
no constitutional rights, was not "fundamental" to the opinion.96 In other
words, at most four Justices in Verdugo- Urquidez embraced the strong position
that aliens outside the United States benefit from no constitutional rights, and
if Justice Kennedy was right, they did so only in dicta.
How did Justice Rehnquist reach the stronger position? He spent some
time trying to show that the cases in which aliens were found to have constitu-
tional rights "establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when
they have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country."97  Moreover, by "substantial
connections" he meant connections deeper than mere presence in the country;
he meant something like lawfully and voluntarily establishing residence in the
country.98
94. 476 F.3d at 991. Disappointingly, even Judge Rogers, in dissent in Boumediene, bought the
majority line about what the precedent actually says. Id. at 1011 ("[The Supreme Court in Eisentrager held
that the Constitution does not afford rights to aliens in this context." Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770; accord
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269. Although in Rasul the Court cast doubt on the continuing vitality of
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-79, absent an explicit statement by the Court that it intended to overrule Eisentrager
's constitutional holding, that holding is binding on this court.). A proper reading of Eisentrager, as we
demonstrate, shows there is nothing to overrule.
95. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278.
96. Id. at 275.
97. Id. at 271.
98. Rehnquist commented that Verdugo-Urquidez's "lawful but involuntary" presence in the
country (he was brought into the United States by U.S. marshals after being delivered to the border by
Mexican police) "is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country." Id.
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This statement of what the case law shows is, however, inaccurate. As
Rehnquist himself showed in an earlier part of the discussion, analyzing the so
called "Insular Cases,"99 aliens outside the United States, but in territories
controlled by the United States, benefit from constitutional rights, even if only
from "fundamental" ones.'00 Moreover, as Justice Kennedy noted, a criminal
defendant taken to U.S. territory and tried there benefits from all the normal
constitutional trial rights, even though he has taken no voluntary steps to
develop a substantial connection with the United States. 0 '
Nevertheless, taken together, the cases Rehnquist reviewed establish that
aliens benefit from constitutional rights only insofar as they live in, or at least
are present in, territory controlled by the United States. They do not establish
that aliens outside territory controlled by the United States have constitutional
rights.
Rehnquist also examined the case that did the most to disconnect constitu-
tional protection from living in territory governed by the United States: Reid
v. Covert. He noted correctly that the plurality and concurring opinions in Reid
were all couched in terms of how the Constitution's Fifth Amendment due
process rights would cover U.S. citizens abroad.0 2 Connecting this with what
was shown about aliens, we see that no case law establishes that aliens living
outside territory controlled by the United States benefit from constitutional
rights.
Of course, failing to establish that something is the case is not the same as
establishing that something is not the case. The argument so far leaves it an
open question whether aliens outside of U.S. territory benefit from
constitutional rights. To plug that hole, Rehnquist appealed to Eisentrager and
claimed that Eisentrager's "rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendment was emphatic."' 3 This would be very significant, if true, for it is
the Fifth Amendment that guarantees that the federal government shall not
deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."° If
99. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial inapplicable
in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (Fifth Amendment grand jury provision
inapplicable in Philippines); Doff v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (jury trial provision inapplicable in
Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury trial
inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
100. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268.
101. Id. at 278. Indeed, 14 years prior to Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court had held that "[e]ven one
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [the] protection [of the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments]." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
102. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270.
103. See id. at 269.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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such protections do not apply, then it is unclear why any others should. But
Rehnquist's reading of Eisentrager is sloppy and exaggerated.I°5
The first thing to notice is that if this were the right reading of Eisentrager,
then Eisentrager would no longer be good law; it would have been overruled
six years later by Reid, which held, emphatically, that the Fifth Amendment's
protection of due process rights does apply extraterritorially. °6 Eisentrager
was not overruled by Reid because Eisentrager was concerned with the
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment to aliens, whereas Reid was
concerned with the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment to U.S.
citizens. Nonetheless, even adjusting Rehnquist's point so that it only applies
to aliens, the fact that Reid established that the Fifth Amendment does have
extraterritorial application six years after Eisentrager provides some reason to
question whether the holding in Eisentrager presupposed a view about the
territorial limits of the Constitution that is no longer good law."0 7
Second, the passage in Eisentrager that Rehnquist cited to support his
claim about what Eisentrager "emphatically" rejected does not refer specifi-
cally to the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, it
refers only to "[s]uch extraterritorial application of organic law."' 0 8 The actual
reference of that clause is "the companion civil rights Amendments" such as
"freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to
bear arms as in the Second, security against 'unreasonable' searches and
seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments."'0 9  In other words, the text is not even about the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process clause.
Third, not only did Rehnquist misdescribe the text he quotes, he was
simply mistaken that Eisentrager emphatically rejected the extraterritorial
application of the Fifth or other amendments. A fair reading of the majority
opinion in Eisentrager is that the Court actually left open the possibility that
nonresident aliens might benefit from some constitutional rights. It is crucial
to be clear about this, as Eisentrager is the lynchpin case for those who think
that there is settled precedent according to which the Constitution does not
105. It was also unnecessary. Rehnquist could have satisfied himself with a narrower argument about
Fourth Amendment rights. But he seems to have wanted to make a statement about the limits of
constitutional protections generally.
106. Reid, 354 U.S. at 2.
107. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guanitdnamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 61 (2004)
[hereinafter Neuman 1].
108. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784).
109. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
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apply to nonresident aliens." 0 But neither the explicit language of the case nor
the reasoning of the case supports this claim.
The explicit language of Eisentrager never says that nonresident aliens as
a category do not benefit from constitutional rights. It always frames the issue
more narrowly in terms like these: the "nonresident enemy alien, especially one
who has remained in the service of the enemy.""'1 As the Court put it in
concluding its discussion of the application of the Fifth Amendment to the
petitioners in that case: "[w]e hold that the Constitution does not confer a right
of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an
alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the
United States."' 2 Notice how different this holding is from Justice Rehnquist's
gloss. Admitting that nonresident aliens can be tried in times of war by military
commissions, and then punished if convicted, is a far cry from admitting that
nonresident aliens benefit from no Fifth Amendment protections at all.'
In addition, the argument in Eisentrager, with regard to nonresident aliens
having Fifth Amendment rights, implies nothing stronger. The argument pro-
ceeded in three steps. First, the Court noted that "American citizens con-
scripted into the military service are thereby stripped of their Fifth Amendment
rights and as members of the military establishment are subject to its discipline,
including military trials for offenses against aliens or Americans.""' 4 This is
relevant because the petitioners in this case were contesting their convictions
by military commissions. The Court reasoned that "[i]t would be a paradox
indeed if what the Amendment denied to Americans it guaranteed to
enemies."" 5 It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this argument that
the Court meant to say that nonresident aliens benefit from no Fifth
Amendment rights. Indeed, one of the cases the Court cites, Wade v. Hunter, 16
110. Even those writers who are fairly critical of the DTA and MCA, such as Richard Fallon and
Daniel Meltzer accept that Eisentrager should be interpreted to hold "that the Constitution did not compel
the extension of jurisdiction because the petitioners, given their limited contacts with the United States,
enjoyed no constitutional rights." Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029,2056 (2007).
111. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776 (emphasis added).
112. Id.at785.
113. Some argue that Eisentrager's ruling should be understood jurisdictionally: that federal courts
do not even have the jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from nonresident aliens because they lack
"standing." 339 U.S. at 777. But that cannot be the right way to read the case, as Justice Jackson goes on
to say that "the doors of our courts have not been summarily closed upon these prisoner" and proceeds to
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actually holds that the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause does apply
to conscripted American citizens. Thus, the only point the Court made in the
end was the comparative point that nonresident aliens could not have more Fifth
Amendment protections than conscripted U.S. citizens.
Second, the Court noted that resident aliens, in time of war, have relatively
thin Fifth Amendment rights, and again argued that it would be perverse to
extend greater coverage to nonresident aliens than to resident aliens." 7 But this
too is only a comparative point, and it is not as if resident aliens, even in time
of war, have no Fifth Amendment rights.
Third, the Court noted that it would be absurd to grant to "irreconcilable
enemy elements, guerrilla fighters and 'were-wolves"' living under a condition
of military occupation, all the rights granted U.S. citizens in the U.S, rights such
as the "freedoms of speech, press, and assembly" or the "right to bear arms."' 8
But this point, along with the two preceding points, is consistent with the view
taken a few years later by Justice Harlan "that the question of which specific
safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular
context overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due' a
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case.""' 9 Again, Harlan
said this in a discussion of what was due American citizens overseas, but the
arguments in Eisentrager are fully consistent with extending Harlan's point to
nonresident aliens.
In sum, Eisentrager no more "emphatically" rejected any and all
application of the Fifth Amendment to nonresident aliens than it "emphatically"
rejected the application of any and all Fifth Amendment protections to
conscripted American citizens. The only point the Eisentrager Court needed
to make to justify its holding was that the nonresident aliens in that case did not
suffer the violation of any Fifth Amendment rights by being tried and convicted
by a military commission. Any stronger inferences one might draw from the
Court's sometimes incautious language would be unwarranted in view of a
careful reading of the case. 20
Finally, one might appeal to the fact that the majority in Zadvydas v. Davis
took Verdugo-Urquidez to have held that the "Fifth Amendment's protections
do not extend to aliens outside the territorial boundaries.'' But this was in
117. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
118. See Neuman I, supra note 107. This is the part of the Eisentrager argument that most
impressed the majority in Boumediene. See 476 F.3d at 991.
119. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75.
120. For a similar, though complementary, reading of Eisentrager, see Neuman I, supra note 107,
at 54-65. See also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 984 (2002).
121. 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
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dicta. Moreover, it was only a parenthetical reading of the holding of Verdugo-
Urquidez. In the text of Zadvydas itself, the Court said only that "[i]t is well
established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the
United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.' 2
This provides no ground for the claim that nonresident aliens can be
indefinitely detained without raising any constitutional concerns.
Thus, we see that there is no well established rule that nonresident aliens
do not benefit from any constitutional rights or protections. The flip side is true
as well, however. Justice Rehnquist was correct to note that Reid extended
constitutional rights beyond the territorial control of the United States only to
U.S. citizens. And the Insular cases extend (fundamental) constitutional rights
to aliens only in territories controlled by the United States. Thus, to resolve the
issue and to do so honestly, we must look to the underlying justifications for
adopting one policy or another.
C. Reasons to Recognize that Nonresident Aliens Benefit from
Constitutional Rights.
There has been a longstanding fight in U.S. jurisprudence between those
who take a "membership" position, who would extend constitutional protec-
tions only to U.S. citizens or those in U.S. territory, and those who take a
"mutuality of obligation" position,'23 according to which whenever the United
States exercises authority over people and expects them to respect its law, it
acquires an obligation to respect those people in return-an obligation that is
to be understood in terms of those people having constitutional rights against
the United States. 24 We argue here, following the lead set by Gerald Neuman,
that the only reasonable position is the mutuality of obligation position.2 5
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. In an earlier article, Alec Walen & Ingo Venzke, Unconstitutional Detention of Nonresident
Aliens: Revisiting the Supreme Court's Treatment ofthe Law of War in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 67 HEIDELBERG
J. INT'L L. 843, 870 (2007), we referred to this as the "responsibility position."
124. We draw this distinction from Gerald L. Neuman's work. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS
TO THE CONSTITUTION 116 (1996) [hereinafter NEUMAN 1]; Neuman 1, supra note 107.
125. Neuman also discusses two other positions: "universalism" and "global due process."
Universalism would require the United States to recognize constitutional rights the would fit a just world
order. As he points out, this is not what the actual U.S. Constitution was designed to do. NEUMAN II, supra
note 124, at 110. Global due process is the view that only core constitutional protections apply to nonresident
aliens, where the limit has something to do with "practicality." Neuman contrasts that with what he calls
mutuality, which asks which constitutional protections must be provided if a government is "to justify its
claim to obedience." Id. at 116. We follow Neuman in thinking that it is this last question which is
normatively fundamental.
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Indeed, it turns out that the only plausible version of the membership position
collapses into the mutuality position. 12 6
There are a number of important legal and moral ideas that underlie the
mutuality position. The most basic may be the moral idea that all persons
possess equal dignity; no one exists to serve others. Aliens cannot have duties
to respect U.S. law, unless the U.S. law has a duty to respect them.'27 As James
Madison put it in the context of aliens in the United States: "as they owe, on
one hand, a temporary obedience [to the laws], they are entitled, in return, to
their protection and advantage."' 28  Now what was once the temporary
obedience owed by aliens in the United States has been extended to a
permanent demand that aliens everywhere obey a range of U.S. laws. 129 The
United States claims the right to prosecute nonresident aliens for crimes that
affect the United States or its citizens.130  Thus, Madison's point must be
adapted to recognize that even nonresident aliens are entitled, in return, to the
Constitution's most basic protections.
In addition, the mutuality approach gives due weight to the idea that with
authority comes responsibility. This notion of responsibility is reflected in the
fundamental legal principle that the U.S. government is a creature of law.
Accordingly, it should never have a free hand to inflict whatever certain
members of the government, particularly the executive, may want to inflict
upon whomever they want to inflict it.'3' This is not to say that the government
126. Note, we do not mean to imply that there may not be other reasons for extending constitutional
rights to nonresident aliens. For example, the desire to obtain the good will of other nations could provide
a self-interested reason to extend constitutional protections broadly. Our main concern is to show that there
are principled reasons to do so, and that the arguments against the mutuality position do not succeed.
127. This Kantian conception of political equality and reciprocity could be challenged by
Hobbesians, who point out that according to Hobbes the people owe a duty to the sovereign, but the sovereign
owes no duties to the people. Without entering into a debate about Hobbesian political theory, it is enough
to point out that the Hobbesian view does not fit United States practice, in which the government has many
duties to the people.
128. James Madison, Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), in 4 DEBATES,
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 556 (J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836), available at http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/
ratification/elliot/vol4/reportvirginia.html (cited in Neuman I, supra note 107, at 52).
129. See Neuman I, supra note 107, at 45 (stating that after World War II, "extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. law mushroomed.").
130. See NEUMAN I, supra note 124, at 108.
131. Consider Justice Kennedy's statement, concurring in Verdugo- Urquidez: "the Government may
act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic." 494 U.S.
at 277. See also Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6 ("The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by
the Constitution."); Neuman I, supra note 107, at 44-45.
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has to treat nonresident aliens just as it would citizens. It is only to say that it
cannot view the treatment of nonresident aliens simply as a question of political
expedience, unbounded by concern for the value of liberty that lies at the heart
of the Constitution.
This principle that the government may not do whatever it wants with
nonresident aliens is itself legally well grounded in a number of ways. The
framers of the Constitution clearly took certain rights protected by the
Constitution to be natural rights possessed by all persons. '32 It is also reflected
in the civil war amendments, which ended slavery and the legacy of categories
of people subject to unchecked power. 3 3 Lastly, it is at the core of international
human rights law which not only binds governments in relation to their
constituencies, but in their actions towards all individuals under their
jurisdiction.'34
What, then, can be said in favor of the membership position? Its root
appeal lies in the social contract notion of a community that has come together
under a shared commitment to a particular legal system. So the question for the
membership position is whether there is a plausible conception of membership
in a legal community according to which constitutional protections would not
be offered to nonresident aliens who are nonetheless subject to U.S. power.
The answer is no.
One way to frame the membership position is to view the Constitution as
a compact between members of society. But as Justice Kennedy notes, "[t]he
force of the Constitution is not confined because it was brought into being by
certain persons who gave their immediate assent to its terms."'' 35 In other
words, the Constitution takes on a legal life of its own, and not only does it
govern some who did not assent to the compact but eventually, if it should last
long enough, it will govern a people none of whom were part of the originating
compact.
132. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 2 (1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights...").
See also JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
290-93 (1996).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XII-XV.
134. See ICCPR, supra note 60, art. 2 1 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant"). Id. Despite the recent, implausible protestations of the United States, "territory"
and "jurisdiction" have to be read disjunctively. See, e.g., Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"?
Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil andPolitical Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L.
L. 739, 790-804 (2005).
135. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276.
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One might appeal to another level of membership and say that it is only
those who are duty bound by the Constitution who are also capable of
benefiting from its protections. This idea, however appealing it may be in the
abstract, does not make sense when one thinks about the workings of
constitutional law. With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, ending
slavery, all other constitutional rights are actually merely limitations on state
actors. The First Amendment's right to free speech, for example, is really just
a prohibition on making laws that abridge the freedom of speech. Likewise, the
Fifth Amendment's protection of liberty is really just a guarantee that the
government shall not remove it without due process of law. Thus, with regard
to all but one right, only government actors have a duty.'36 Yet it is the people
or persons in general who benefit from the various rights. Thus, this notion of
a membership community is also implausible.
One might broaden the conception of membership community yet again,
so that it comprises people who have a duty to obey the law that is ultimately
grounded in the Constitution. Perhaps only they are entitled to benefit from the
protections offered by the foundational legal principles of the law. But if the
condition that would allow one to benefit from constitutional rights is that one
is subject to prosecution by U.S. prosecutors for violations of U.S. laws, then
everyone in the world benefits from constitutional rights, as everyone in the
world is subject to prosecution by U.S. prosecutors enforcing laws that defend
the United States and its citizens.' 37
One might try to narrow, rather than broaden, the conception of member-
ship, so that it includes only citizens. Certainly citizens are paradigmatically
members of a society; the only ones with a full stake, including the right to have
a say, through their voting, in what the law will be. And if one defines the
community this way, one can then say that the country has chosen-perhaps as
a matter of magnanimity, or perhaps to avoid the unsightly spectacle of a two-
tiered system of justice within the "homeland"-to grant resident aliens
constitutional rights as well. Such a choice, one might then argue, was not
morally required, and a similar choice is likewise not required with regard to
nonresident aliens. If there are prudential reasons to allow the legislature and
executive more flexibility with regard to nonresident aliens, then they should
not be granted constitutional rights which would interfere with the pursuit of
those reasons.
136. Could it be argued that the one duty binding on all saves this position? If so, that it would mean
that only government officials benefited from constitutional rights prior to the adoption of the 13th
Amendment. Surely that position cannot be maintained.
137. See NEUMAN II, supra note 124, at 108.
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The proper response to this suggestion is to question whether it really was
morally unnecessary to grant resident aliens constitutional protections. Can it
really be maintained that they might come to the United States at their peril,
subject to arbitrary search and seizure, to prosecution without due process, and
to whatever punishment the state might choose to dispense? Such a position
has a certain consistency to it, but in contrast to Madison's position, that they
owe obedience to the law and are owed the protection of the law at the same
time, this position is, to use an antiquated word, barbaric. If this is the price of
maintaining the membership position, then the price is too high.
Moreover, the moral failure of this interpretation of the membership
position cannot be remedied by expanding membership to Rehnquist's concep-
tion of the relevant membership position, one that includes resident aliens who
have voluntarily and legally established substantial connections with the United
States. For one thing, this position would leave illegal immigrants and those
captured abroad and tried in the United States subject to the same abusive
treatment that we would not allow the government to inflict on aliens with a
"substantial connection" to the United States-a position that the Court has, as
noted above, rejected. More fundamentally, Rehnquist's position is still
without a solid moral foundation. The primary moral appeal of his position lies
in the image of citizens as hosts and of aliens who have made the relevant
substantial connection as invited guests. But it still fails to come to terms with
the extent to which, to stick to the domestic metaphor, one also has relations
with and makes demands on one's neighbors. It would indeed be especially
perverse to expect one's neighbors to respect one's own rights (as one
formulates them), and then not respect their basic rights in return.
In sum, we see that the membership position either reduces to the
mutuality position, or it assumes a morally barbaric form, one more fit for
members of the mafia than a moral community.
We can think of only one other argument for the position that limits
constitutional rights to those who are U.S. citizens or who are to be found in
territory generally governed by U.S. law, and that is one that appeals to the
notion of sovereignty.'38 The thought is that where the United States is
sovereign, as it is over its territories, its Constitution rules; but where the
United States is not sovereign some other country must be sovereign. Where
138. It seems likely that some thought along this line explains the almost fetishistic concern some
courts had with whether Cuba was technically still sovereign over Guantinamo, even despite the United
States having unchecked effective control. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-41
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (reading Eisentrager "to mean that the constitutional rights mentioned are not held by aliens
outside the sovereign territory of the United States.") (emphasis added); Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 992 ("The
text of the lease and decisions of circuit courts and the Supreme Court all make clear that Cuba-not the
United States-has sovereignty over Guantinamo Bay.") (emphasis added).
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another country is sovereign, its guarantees of rights are the only ones to which
people can look. The only exception would be for U.S. citizens who are
confronted by the exercise of U.S. power in another country. They, as members
of U.S. society, can demand that their government treat them with the respect
due U.S. citizens. But nonresident aliens must look to their own governments
or the governments where they reside for the protection of their rights.
In a world divided between sovereigns that take care of their own citizens
and visitors, this position might make sense. But in reality it makes no sense
at all. First, it presupposes that executive power and jurisdiction always
correspond with sovereign control over territory. That is not the case.
Guantinamo itself represents a living counter-example, as Cuba has sovereignty
but exercises neither executive powers nor jurisdiction over Guantdnamo.
Moreover, it would be a mistake to fixate on the special status of GuantAnamo
as a place where the United States can exercise control as long as it chooses.
The same problem arises, even if not indefinitely, whenever one country
invades and occupies another. In such periods there are people who live under
the power of a sovereign, but according to this picture, have no rights against
it. Rather, they live at the mercy of it. This puts the lie to the sanguine
unspoken premise of this view.
Second, even if the world were fully divided between sovereigns that took
care of their own people, the appeal of this model presupposes that all
sovereigns do a reasonable job of protecting their people. This, however, is
patently false. There are many countries that provide little to no protection for
anyone.'39 The position articulated here would allow the United States to
exploit the moral and legal degradation of regimes that show no respect for
human rights. The behavior of the United States should not be allowed to sink
to the lowest common denominator, especially not when the United States has
the economic and military clout to influence other states and cause them to sink
lower than they might independently be willing to go.
There is one more move that someone might make to deny that nonresident
aliens are due constitutional protections. It might be agreed that the
membership position is morally defensible only when interpreted to coincide
with the mutuality position, but at the same time, it might be asserted that this
kind of choice is one that has to be left to the people, speaking democratically.
139. Consider, for example, the many reports of the United States engaging in "rendition" to
countries that will torture people to get information. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Annals of Justice; Outsourcing




It might be thought that it is up to the people, not unelected judges, to extend
the Constitution's protections to nonresident aliens.140
The problem with this argument is that it presupposes that the right
interpretation of the Constitution is one in which nonresident aliens are left
outside its protections. It might be tempting to think that because it has not yet
been concluded that they are inside its protections. But the truth is that it has
also not yet been decided that they are outside its protections. Lack of
established precedent is just that; it does not favor one choice over another.
It might be argued that those who voted to adopt the Bill of Rights in 1791
would not have expected the Fifth Amendment to provide protections to
nonresident aliens. But even if that were true, the reason is surely that those
who drafted and ratified the text would not have expected the United States to
have the power it now has. We simply cannot know how they would have
voted, or even what text they might have voted on, if the United States had been
the kind of power then that it is now.
In sum, it is up to the present Court-or if they duck it, some future
Court-to determine how to interpret the coverage of the Due Process Clause.
Our point is that the relevant moral reasons clearly point in the direction of
interpreting it through the principle of mutuality of obligation. 141
Again, we are not saying that the United States has to accord nonresident
aliens every constitutional right it accords residents (whether alien or citizen).
We agree with Justice Harlan, that "the question of which specific safeguards
of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context
overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due." 142 If application
of a particular protection would be "anomalous," then it cannot also be "due."
As noted by Justice Kennedy, concurring in Verdugo-Urquidez, certain rights
such as the Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches, would be
anomalous in foreign countries.143 Likewise, the worries expressed by Justice
Jackson, that the United States would be obliged to protect, for example, the
right to bear arms of those living in a country occupied by the U.S. military,
should not be a concern.1" The Constitution is not a suicide pact,'45 and such
140. This is the kind of position articulated by ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
59 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
141. For theoretical support for looking to morality to interpret constitutional text, see Ronald
Dworkin, Commentary to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 115-27 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-15 (1996).
142. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75.
143. 494 U.S. at 278.
144. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
145. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
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rights would not be "due." However, "[t]he time has long passed when 'no
quarter' was the rule on the battlefield."'46 Now enemies in battle are captured
if possible, and those who are captured are due certain protections under the
law of war. Likewise, they are due certain fundamental protections under the
U.S. Constitution. The most basic of these is that they not be deprived of their
liberty without due process of law.'47
V. THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS AND THE LAW OF WAR
There are two issues left to resolve. First, how should the Court
understand the Fifth Amendment due process rights of nonresident aliens?
Second, how can aliens bring due process challenges to their detentions? In
Part III we discussed what the law of war, as represented in the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocol I, has to say about the process due
civilians in the current "war on terror." In Part II we argued that the Court's
citation to the law of war in-Hamdi had constitutional significance. Now in this
Part we want to tie these loose ends together and argue that U.S. constitutional
law should properly take guidance from the law of war when devising norms
of due process for nonresident aliens. Then, in the next and final Part, we
address how nonresident aliens can bring their challenges in court.
A. Grounding a Link
International law has figured in U.S. law since its founding. The
Declaration of Independence was written to show "a decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind."'4 8 Article I, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution lists
among the enumerated powers of the Congress "[t]o define and punish...
Offenses against the Law of Nations."' 149 And as early as 1804, the Supreme
Court treated international law as a constraint on the interpretation of statutes
analogous to that provided by constitutional text: "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."'50 Our suggestion, then, is that when interpreting the
146. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920) (quoted by the
Court in Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518).
147. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,690 (2001) ("The Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause forbids the Government to 'depriv[e]' any 'person... of... liberty.., without due process of law.'
Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies
at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.").
148. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1.
149. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28.
150. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
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U.S. Constitution, it makes sense to look to international law norms for
guidance.
In opposition to this view, there has been, in recent years, a chorus of
complaints that U.S. law should not be interpreted with reference to
international legal standards. Leading this charge has been Justice Scalia. As
he once put it, "where there is not first a settled consensus among our own
people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this
Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution."'' His complaint seems to be that consulting the views of other
nations would somehow undermine the sovereignty of the United States or the
power of the U.S. people democratically to govern themselves. But the
complaint is overblown. No one is suggesting that the standards of
international law, much less the "views of other nations," should be binding
upon the Justices of the Supreme Court.'52 The suggestion is only that these
standards are relevant for the light they cast on how U.S. constitutional norms
should be interpreted.'53
As Harold Koh has argued, one of the ways in which foreign and inter-
national law has been invoked by the Supreme Court has been in interpreting
what he calls "community standards."' 54 These are norms such as avoiding
"cruel and unusual punishment"'5 or providing "due process of law" that
invoke standards that are shared by many nations. The United States has a long
tradition of consulting the practices of other countries and international conven-
tions and covenants when considering how to interpret these concepts. For
example, in carving out the limits of the death penalty the Court has looked
repeatedly to the practices of other countries and international conventions and
covenants that reject the death penalty for rape,'56 for juveniles,' and for the
mentally retarded.' So too has the Court looked to international legal opinion
in matters of "substantive due process" liberty rights. In Bowers v. Hardwick,
151. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. International law has no force in the United States if inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution,
as properly interpreted. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115 (1987).
153. To be fair to Scalia, his real concern is that Justices on the Supreme Court would use their own
judgment to settle issues where there is not a settle consensus, and where neither an original understanding
of the text nor U.S. history and tradition calls for a particular resolution. But then the influence of foreign
law is really a red herring. What really bothers him is the use of constitutional judgment. See SCALIA, supra
note 140, at 59. We disagree with his jeremiad against judicial judgment, but do not press the argument here.
154. Harold Hongju Koh, International: Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43,45 (2004).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
156. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1976).
157. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
158. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002).
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Chief Justice Burger concurred that the Constitution's protection of privacy did
not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy in part because
"[d]ecisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject
to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization."' 59 And
when the Court overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, it took issue with
Burger's reading of the state of international law, noting that "[t]he sweeping
references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western civilization and to
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account of other
authorities pointing in an opposite direction.""16
The case for looking to international legal norms for guidance in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution is particularly strong when there is no
developed legal framework for interpreting a particular norm. In cases of first
impression, a court will normally look to the actions of other courts and to legal
authorities in general, for their "persuasive" authority. The goal in doing so is
not, of course, to abdicate their responsibility in formulating a legal decision.
As Koh says, judges do not look to international law in order to do "some kind
of global 'nose count.'"l. Rather, the point of looking to international law is
to discover reasoned guidance in a more or less uncertain area of law.
The case for looking to international legal norms for guidance in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution is even stronger when the United States is
taking actions in an international context. Indeed, in the context of the "war on
terror," the United States claims universal jurisdiction to prosecute nonresident
aliens for commission of international crimes. The MCA lists twenty-eight
crimes that, according to its own terms, have traditionally been tried by military
commissions. '62 The United States can claim the right to prosecute nonresident
aliens for those crimes, even when they are committed outside U.S. jurisdiction
and its citizens are not the victims of the crimes, only if these crimes are
international crimes. The international law framework that establishes
universal jurisdiction is the Geneva Conventions, which provide for universal
jurisdiction over grave breaches of the laws of war.'63 Thus, to prosecute
nonresident aliens under the MCA's appeal to universal jurisdiction, the United
States has committed itself to respecting the law of war as stated in the Geneva
Conventions.
159. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
160. 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
161. Koh, supra note 154, at 56.
162. Regarding the claim that these are crimes traditionally tried by military commissions, see 10
U.S.C. § 9 50p; regarding the list of 28 offenses, see 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(l)-(28). Whether this claim is true
or not is immaterial to our purposes here.
163. GC HI, supra note 38, arts. 129-30; GC IV, supra note 38, arts. 146-47.
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The development of due process rights for nonresident aliens is just such
a case of first impression in an international context. As noted in Part IV,
section B, there is no settled case law on the foundational question whether
nonresident aliens benefit from Fifth Amendment due process rights. If it is
agreed that they do, then the law must be developed to determine how they do.
Again quoting Justice Harlan, the question is: "what process is 'due' a
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case."'" Our
suggestion is that among the best sources for determining what process is due
is the law of war. Moreover, in claiming universal jurisdiction, the United
States commits itself to respecting the same.165
B. Defending Against Fairness Objections
There are at least two sorts of objections that could be raised to the
suggestion that the United States look to the law of war when searching for a
standard for the process due a nonresident alien before he is subject to long
term preventive detention; it would put the United States at an unreasonable
disadvantage in combating international terrorism and it would unfairly give
nonresident aliens advantages over resident aliens and citizens. We focus in
this section on the fairness objection, but we pause briefly to address the other.
We argued in Part III, section E that the balance struck in the law of war
allows the United States to do what it would need to do to protect itself from
terrorism, while also respecting the importance of liberty. We add here that if
it were truly imperative to strike a new balance in the war on terror, the reasons
for doing so would apply as well in the domestic case, or when dealing with
nonresident citizens, as when dealing with nonresident aliens.'66 Since there is
no significant push to rewrite constitutional protections domestically or for U. S.
citizens abroad, we infer that there is probably no good reason to embrace a
different balance when extending constitutional protections to nonresident
aliens.
Turning now to the fairness objection, one might argue for a fairness
principle, as articulated in Eisentrager, according to which it would be
constitutionally anomalous to have to offer nonresident aliens more protections
164. 354 U.S at 75 (Harlan J., concurring).
165. If due process rights for nonresident aliens were modeled on the rights contained in GC IV,
would that imply that the United States was now constitutionally bound to adhere to GC IV? No, if the
Congress and Executive wanted to withdraw from the treaty, they would be constitutionally free to do so.
The standard in GC IV is separable from the treaty itself. However, even if the United States were to
withdraw from the treaty, it would be in violation of customary international law were it to act contrary to its
provisions.
166. See, e.g., Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1365 (2007).
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than those offered U.S. citizens or resident aliens.167 There are reasons to doubt
the validity of this principle; since aliens lack the vote, they form a kind of
discrete and more or less insular population that may need extra protection from
political forces in the United States that would unjustly seek political benefit
at their expense. 6 Moreover, it is not unheard of for aliens to have advantages
that citizens lack. 169 But we put these concerns to the side in order to examine
the Eisentrager test both with regard to the treatment Eisentrager said was due
resident aliens and with regard to the issue of the suspension of habeas.
Justice Jackson noted in Eisentrager that resident aliens from an enemy
country can be detained for the duration of the war against that country.
"Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from Executive custody only to
ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether he is an alien enemy and
so subject to the Alien Enemy Act."' 7 The process so described seems actually
thinner than that provided by a CSRT. If this is all that a resident alien civilian
is entitled to receive, then surely it is mistaken to think that nonresident alien
civilians are entitled to more.
There are at least two responses that can be made to this argument,
however. First, it is not clear that the Alien Enemy Act should still be
considered good law regarding resident aliens. It might be argued, in the wake
of Zadvydas-the 2001 case constitutionally limiting the use of preventive
detention on resident aliens who had been ordered removed by the Immigration
167. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
168. See Katyal, supra note 166, at 1373. Consider also that international law sets higher standards
for states in their relation with foreigners, as compared to nationals, when it comes to expropriation and
compensation This finds expression in the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, art. I, Mar. 20, 1952, Eur.T.S. 9, in relation to
which the European Court of Human Rights explained:
Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform or
an economic restructuring, there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction
between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. To begin
with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike nationals, they
will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its authors nor have
been consulted on its adoption.
Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 116 (1986). Similar reasoning has also
been used when assessing the protections offered to out-of-state residents, as compared to in-state residents,
by the Privileges and Immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See United Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
169. For example in European Community law we find the well established term of
"lnliinderdiskriminierung" (i.e., reverse discrimination). The French brewer could sell a product denoted
"beer" in Germany even if it does not meet the German "Reinheitsgebot" of 1516 which limits the ingredients
to malted barley, hops, yeast and water, because he or she benefits from fundamental freedoms of European
Community law. A German could not do so. See Case 178/84, Comm'n v. F.R.G., 1987 E.C.R. 1227.
170. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775.
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and Naturalization Service, and who were being held indefinitely (beyond the
ninety day removal period stated in the statute) because no other country would
take them-that resident aliens now have a constitutional right not to be
detained indefinitely; that the United States now must either deport them to
their home country or release them, perhaps under some program of supervised
release.' 7 ' In addition, the United States has signed the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which is federal law that occurs later in time than the Alien Enemy
Act, and is inconsistent with it. Indeed, the GC IV uses a standard for the
preventive detention of resident aliens much like the standard it uses for
nonresident aliens under occupation: "[t]he internment or placing in assigned
residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the
Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary."'72 This is more limiting than
the free hand granted the President under the Alien Enemy Act.
Second, it is possible to distinguish the security situation of the resident
alien from the nonresident alien. Nonresident aliens are not such an immediate
threat to the United States. They are already effectively deported, and thus the
same cause for detention is not present in their case.'73 A stronger presumption
against preventively detaining nonresident aliens should therefore pass the
Eisentrager test.
Turning now to the suspension of habeas, an argument can be made that
nonresident aliens should not benefit from enforceable constitutional rights in
places like Afghanistan and Iraq because conditions there are such that, were
those same conditions to apply in the United States, habeas would be
suspended, or at least subject to suspension. Habeas can be suspended "when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."' 74 If habeas
were suspended in the United States, even citizens could be denied the benefit
of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. By analogous reasoning, if
equally drastic conditions, amounting to a "Rebellion or Invasion," apply
outside the United States where the United States is nonetheless trying to
impose order and provide for the public safety, then Fifth Amendment rights
need not apply.
This is an important argument. We concede that if the security situation
in a region where the United States is operating is sufficiently insecure, then it
171. On supervised release as an option, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700.
172. GC IV, supra note 38, art. 42, 1 (emphasis added).
173. A similar point is marked in GC IV, which makes it harder to justify preventively detaining
nonresident aliens under occupation than resident aliens. "In occupied territories the internment of protected
persons should be even more exceptional than it is inside the territory of the Parties to the conflict; for in the
former case the question of nationality does not arise." Uhler, supra note 56, art. 78.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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would make sense for habeas rights to be suspended there. The insurrections,
with incursions from other countries, in Afghanistan and Iraq may seem to be
paradigm cases for such a suspension. But it is important to keep in mind that
the conditions for suspending habeas can and should be read to apply in a
limited manner.'75
There are not many historical examples to work with, but those that exist
show that habeas should be suspended only where, and only for as long as, it
is imperative to do so. Habeas has been suspended a total of four times in the
history of the United States. The first time was during the Civil War where
habeas seems to have been suspended broadly.'76 The next time it was
suspended, in 1871, President Grant suspended it for only ten counties of North
Carolina in his effort to combat the Ku Klux Klan. 177  Habeas was next
suspended by the Governor of the Philippines in 1905, in two provinces of the
Philippines, in order to combat organized bands that were terrorizing the
population. 7 8 Finally, it was suspended in what was then the territory of
Hawaii in 1941.179 In all but the first suspension, the range of the suspension
was limited to an area as small as or smaller than a state or territory. It was
limited to those regions where, and for those times when, the problem was
sufficiently intense to warrant suspension.
We would suggest that the same should apply in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Were the Court to recognize that nonresident aliens have constitutional rights,
and were Congress to decide that these rights might have to be suspended in
certain territories where the United States is engaged in trying to quell
insurrections, it would be appropriate for the executive to suspend habeas, but
only in those areas where the need for public safety requires its suspension, and
only for as long as the violence necessitated such a suspension.18 °
175. One might have also thought that if habeas is available for U.S. citizens in a region, it must be
available to all in a region. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia recently found that a U.S. citizen
in Iraq had the right to habeas. Omar ex rel. Omar, 479 F.3d. at 1. But it is not clear that habeas cannot be
allowed to some and denied to others. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal ofAliens, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 961, 976-78 (1998).
176. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2006).
177. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 178 n. 190 (1980).
In fact, it was only suspended for at most nine counties at a time, as the suspension was lifted in Marion
County before being imposed on Union County. Id.
178. See Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 179 (1906).
179. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307 (1946).
180. The Fisher case provides a good model. The suspension of habeas was lifted in the two
provinces where it had been imposed in less than a year, once the Governor determined that the conditions
requiring the suspension no longer existed. 203 U.S. at 180-81.
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Importantly, the mere fact that U.S. troops patrol an area and that they may
from time to time engage in hostilities with civilians, does not by itself imply
that conditions are so lawless that habeas should, or even legally could, be
suspended. Thus, while this argument does provide a basis for limiting the
practical significance of extending due process rights to nonresident aliens, it
does not undermine the significance of such an extension all together. Rather,
it provides another safety valve for Congress and the Executive to address
emergency situations and thereby should ease any concerns about the security
implications of extending due process rights, modeled on those found in the
Geneva Conventions, to nonresident aliens.
In sum, it is perfectly appropriate and consistent with U.S. constitutional
law, both in text and in practice, to take guidance from international legal
authorities. It is particularly appropriate to use such authorities as a starting
point in cases of first impression and cases dealing with international affairs.
The question of how to extend the Fifth Amendment's protection against the
deprivation of liberty without due process to nonresident aliens, both civilians
and combatants, is just such a case of first impression arising in the context of
international affairs. The international law discussed in Part II1 above should
be a default position for U.S. constitutional law unless it can be shown that
adhering to these norms disables the United States from effectively fighting
international terrorism or is unfair to others whose constitutional rights can be
taken as fixed points. There is no reason to think these exceptions apply.
Therefore, the international legal norms discussed in Part III should be adopted
by the Supreme Court in place of the legally misguided holding in Hamdi, to
the effect that "enemy combatants" can be detained until the end of the "war on
terror."
VI. ACCESS TO COURT
A. Appeals and Habeas Rights
Though the public discussion of detainee access to the federal courts
during the "war on terror" has focused almost exclusively on the availability of
habeas corpus, there is another possible route into federal courts: appeal. The
DTA grants detainees a right to appeal determinations by CSRTs that they are
"enemy combatants" first to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and then to the Supreme Court. 8 ' This appeal right allows detainees to argue
that the Tribunals violated their constitutional rights.'82 There is no obvious
reason why the issues discussed here could not be raised on appeal.
181. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(A).
182. Id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii).
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However, given the recent decision of the Supreme Court to review the
D.C. Circuit's decision to deny petitioners a right to habeas in Boumediene,8 3
this argument may be moot. The scope of review under the DTA is officially
limited to matters of law, with the single exception of whether the CSRTs
determination "was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by
the Secretary of Defense for [CSRTs]."184 This limitation may leave out factual
questions important for determining whether a detention is constitutionally
defensible.185 Unless the function of habeas is adequately provided for by
appeal rights, the MCA cannot constitutionally succeed in stripping away the
right to habeas.'86 In taking certiorari in Boumediene, the Court seems to be
expressing some sympathy with the position that the processes provided for in
the DTA are not an adequate substitute for habeas. 87
In sum, if we are right and nonresident aliens benefit from the Fifth
Amendment right not to be deprived of their liberty without due process of law,
and if the CSRTs do not provide due process of law, then these detainees
cannot be denied their day in court. Unless they can raise the issue of their
unconstitutional detention on appeal from their CSRT hearings-something that
no detainee has yet successfully done-they have a subsidiary right to
constitutional habeas to contest their unconstitutional detentions.188
B. Judicial Power to Remedy Unconstitutional Detention
Even granting that nonresident alien detainees have a constitutional right
not to be detained without due process of law, and that they have a subsidiary
right to petition for habeas corpus to vindicate that right if they cannot raise it
on appeal, it does not necessarily follow that the courts are in a position to do
anything for them. They must first establish that the facts support their claim
that they are indeed being denied due process. And then there must be an
acceptable remedy available to them. We conclude our discussion of alien
detention with a brief review of these issues, arguing that there is some role the
courts can play.
183. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d 981.
184. DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i).
185. We discuss the factual determinations in the next section, VI(B).
186. "[T]he substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the
legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the Great Writ." Swain v. Pressley, 430
U.S. 372, 381 (1977). By contrast, one that is inadequate would constitute a suspension of the writ. Id.
187. At this point in time, no opinions have yet been issued discussing an appeal under the DTA.
It should be noted that the Boumediene court declined to convert the habeas petitions in that case into DTA
appeals. 476 F.3d at 994.
188. On this being a subsidiary right, see Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781.
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We start by reviewing what we suggest is the basic remedy. First, CSRTs
should be redesigned so that they distinguish civilians from combatants.
Having made that distinction, the remedy for each would be different. For
combatants the CSRTs could function as they do now, but it would be made
clear that the cessation of active hostilities is a reference to the international
armed conflict in which they were captured. Once such a war is over-as it
arguably is in both Afghanistan and Iraq-then combatants must either be tried
for crimes and sentenced accordingly, or repatriated. For civilians a richer
review of evidence of dangerousness would be required. They could be
preventively detained only as long as there is reliable evidence that their release
would provide a specific and significant threat to security.
With these suggested revisions on the table, we can ask how courts should
approach the task of adjudicating appeals or habeas petitions (because it may
be possible to raise many of the factual issues only through habeas, we focus
only on that). We start with a preliminary question: would not a right to
habeas disrupt military activities? As Justice Jackson said in Eisentrager, dis-
cussing the idea of granting habeas rights to the twenty-one German detainees:
It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to
submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert
his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal
defensive at home.18 9
Indeed, in the wake of Rasul, over 181 Guantdnamo detainees filed habeas
petitions in the D.C. District Courts.19 ° Are we not, then, proposing a course of
action that would invite disaster by opening up floodgates of disruptive
litigation?
A number of things need to be said to answer that question. We start by
pointing out the role that habeas would play in a properly running system. It is
an avenue for bringing issues before the courts that generally would have
systematic relevance. It would take only one habeas petitioner to establish the
structural reforms mentioned above. Assuming the Supreme Court agreed to
resolve the issue, either reaffirming or revising its holding in Hamdi regarding
indefinite detention, then there would be no need for future petitioners to raise
the same issue. Of course, no matter what the Court says, if the door to habeas
is open, some will try to abuse it. But once the law in this area is developed we
189. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779
190. See Hamdan, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 11. Boumediene, however, lists only fifty-six detainees as
having been involved in the appeal to that case. 476 F.3d at 984.
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can expect a flood of habeas litigation if and only if the United States does not
act in accordance with the law. 9'
Second, at least two of the presuppositions underlying what Justice
Jackson said in Eisentrager are not true. Jackson writes that "[t]he writ, since
it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during
active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and peace."'192 But the
constitutional writ is available only as a subsidiary procedural right to enforce
constitutional rights. Combatants have no constitutional right not to be held
during active hostilities, so they would have no standing to sue then. As for
civilians, if the hostilities in the area are sufficiently disruptive, habeas can be
suspended. If not, then allowing habeas rights should not be too disruptive of
military activities. In addition, Jackson writes as though the detainees might
have to be "transport[ed] across the seas for hearing." This is no longer true.
The Court in Rasul held that the prisoner who seeks habeas no longer has to be
in the jurisdiction of the court that will hear the petition. 93 The only person
who has to be in that court's jurisdiction is the custodian (or someone with
authority over the immediate custodian).'94
Third, in terms of the threat of disrupting the commanders in the field, it
is important to be realistic. Even currently, while the situation in Afghanistan
and Iraq is quite unstable, and U.S. soldiers are dying in action, the United
States is (mostly) not in active battle mode; it is in policing mode. Police can
and do take time off patrol to go to court. Moreover, the courts at issue would
not primarily be the federal court where a habeas petition would be heard.
Habeas litigation can almost always be handled by lawyers without the need for
witnesses. 9' The relevant courts where military witnesses might be called upon
to testify would be the military commissions that would try civilians and those
combatants accused of war crimes; CSRTs to determine the status of
combatants; and a reformed version of CSRTs for civilians-we suggest the
name: Individual Dangerousness Assessment Tribunals (IDATs).
We turn now to the question of how to assess the factual questions that a
court would have to resolve to handle a habeas petition. We start with
combatants, assuming that the question of distinguishing combatants from
civilians is normally unproblematic. How would a court be able to determine
191. See David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and The Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The
Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125, 143 (2005).
192. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
193. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
194. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478 (discussing the change in the law wrought by Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)).
195. SeeMartin, supranote 191,at 139.
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if there are indeed ongoing active hostilities? This is a classic case of a
question that is beyond the competency of a court-one that lies almost
exclusively in the competency of the Executive. The President, informed as he
is by military leaders in the field, will know much more about this than a court.
In addition, the Constitution gives the President, not the Courts, the role of
Commander in Chief of the armed forces'96 and general authority over foreign
affairs.
Nonetheless, the President is as bound by the Constitution as any other
officer of the state and he may not order the detention of combatants after active
hostilities have ended.'97 If a combatant petitioner, perhaps with the aid of
expert testimony, can make out the claim that active hostilities have ceased,
then the burden would shift to the government to offer evidence that this was
not the case. The court would then owe substantial deference to the executive's
judgment, but not absolute deference. Following the Court's definition of
substantial deference in Turner Broad Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), the job of
a court would be "to assure that in formulating its judgment, [the executive] has
drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence."' 98 This would not
put the courts in a position to second guess the executive's judgment about
whether there are ongoing hostilities. Nor, however, would it allow the
government to present a mere sham justification. Even giving substantial
deference, a clearly bogus claim that there are ongoing active hostilities, in the
relevant sense, could be rejected.' 99
Turning now to civilians, the factual question would be whether there is
good reason to believe they are sufficiently dangerous to be preventively
detained. Again, a court could only do so much. The issue would be essenti-
ally one of confirming that the relevant tribunal-the IDAT-was correct to
find that substantial evidence indicates that the individual was really involved
196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
197. It is true that the Court in Ludecke held that "[w]hether and when it would be open to this Court
to find that a war though merely formally kept alive had in fact ended, is a question too fraught with gravity
even to be adequately formulated when not compelled." 335 U.S. at 169. But compulsion may be in the
wings, so it is worth thinking about how to approach this question.
198. 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). Martin suggests an even stronger form of deference, requiring only
that the executive produce "some evidence." Martin, supra note 191, at 147. This is a fine point; our basic
point is the same as Martin's: to strike an acceptable balance between letting the executive and military do
its job and ensuring that it takes its job seriously. Id. at 150.
199. For a case showing the limits of substantial deference, see Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.
v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2004) rev'don other grounds, Gonzales v. Carhart, 127
S.Ct. 1610 (2007) (holding that even using substantial deference, Congress's finding of fact that there is no
need for a health exception to the prohibition on "partial birth abortions" should be rejected, because it "has
not drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.").
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in and committed to engaging in terrorism. Though habeas courts do
traditionally have the authority to resolve factual matters,20 ° they normally do
not re-examine the facts determined by another tribunal.2 ' The kinds of factual
claims that habeas courts typically look at concern procedural defects in a trial
that led to a conviction.20 2 Facts showing such defects would presumably be the
sorts of things one could raise on appeal from an IDAT, assuming the CSRT
appeal procedures still applied.20 3 Whether by appeal or by habeas, however,
it should be possible for a detainee to argue for his release if he can show that
the government has provided no substantive evidence that he is in fact
dangerous.
This brings us to the power of the courts to provide remedies. The issue
here is the separation ofpowers. As Justice Kennedy said, concurring in Rasul:
The decision in Eisentrager indicates that there is a realm of political
authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter.
The existence of this realm acknowledges the power of the President
as Commander in Chief, and the joint role of the President and the
Congress, in the conduct of military affairs.20"
Importantly, Kennedy was not saying that the judicial power may not enter into
the realm of military affairs at all. Rather, as he said, "[a] necessary corollary
of Eisentrager is that there are circumstances in which the courts maintain the
power and the responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even
where military affairs are implicated."2"5 What mattered for Kennedy was that
the courts show a proper respect for "military necessity." He reasoned that the
courts could grant habeas to petitioners in GuantAnamo because it was far
removed from any hostilities, and because:
200. See 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (2007) (on oral evidence, depositions and affidavits); 28 U.S.C. § 2247
(2007) (on documentary evidence).
201. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
202. An illustrative list of such defects is provided in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212
n. 12 (1952); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of trial); Mooneyv. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935) (knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecution); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (no
intelligent waiver of counsel in federal court); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (coerced plea of
guilty); United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 (1943) (no intelligent waiver ofjury trial in
federal court); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (denial of right to consult with counsel).
203. See DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i).
204. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
205. Id. (citing ExParte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,4 (1866)).
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Indefinite detention without trial or other proceeding... suggests a
weaker case of military necessity and much greater alignment with the
traditional function of habeas corpus .... Perhaps, where detainees
are taken from a zone of hostilities, detention without proceedings or
trial would be justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks; but
as the period of detention stretches from months to years, the case for
continued detention to meet military exigencies becomes weaker.2 6
In other words, we come to a balance of constitutional interests.2"7 On the one
hand is the interest of the Executive in controlling military matters, while on the
other hand are the interests of individuals in their liberty. Where the
Executive's need for control over military matters is strong, the courts can do
nothing for the individual. But where the executive's control over military
matters would not really be implicated, and where the individual's interest in
liberty is strong, the courts can do something for the individual.
If a court were convinced, having given the Executive the benefit of
substantial deference, that its claim that there are ongoing hostilities in the
relevant sense is a sham, then the court has already made the determination that
the Executive's control over military matters is not really implicated. Thus, in
such a case the court should not feel obliged to defer to the Executive's
authority over international affairs. It can order the release of detained
combatants. Likewise, if it is convinced, having given all due deference to the
government's evidence, that there is no real evidence that a civilian is a
terrorist, it could order him released.
This brings us to a last objection. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Hamdi,
observes the following about habeas:
The text of the 1679 [English] Habeas Corpus Act makes clear that
indefinite imprisonment on reasonable suspicion is not an available
option of treatment for those accused of aiding the enemy, absent a
suspension of the writ . . . [Section] 7 of the Act specifically
addressed those committed for high treason, and provided a remedy
if they were not indicted and tried by the second succeeding court
term. That remedy was not a bobtailed judicial inquiry into whether
there were reasonable grounds to believe the prisoner had taken up
arms against the King. Rather, if the prisoner was not indicted and
tried within the prescribed time, 'he shall be discharged from his
206. Id. at 488.
207. This kind of balancing is not alien to the Court in the context of the war on terror. Indeed, it
was embraced by the Court in section 3 of Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524-39 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976)).
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Imprisonment.' . . . The Act does not contain any exception for
wartime. That omission is conspicuous, since § 7 explicitly addresses
the offense of 'High Treason,' which often involved offenses of a
military nature. .. . Writings from the founding generation also
suggest that, without exception, the only constitutional alternatives are
to charge the crime or suspend the writ.2"'
The point Justice Scalia is making is that the process we have been defending
is inconsistent with the function of habeas. If we want to admit the necessity
of detaining certain individuals because of the threat they pose, even though
they have not been convicted of a crime, then we need to acknowledge that the
conditions for suspending habeas apply, or that these individuals are not
covered by habeas at all. Supposing that the conditions for suspending habeas
do not apply, that leaves us with the choice to insist that nonresident alien
civilians must be tried or released, despite the danger they may pose, or to
recognize that they are not covered by constitutional habeas (given the MCA,
they are already not covered by statutory habeas).
We reject this argument on the grounds that it presents a false dichotomy.
The better choice is to reject Scalia's originalism with regard to the function of
habeas. We endorse the view relied on in Eisentrager, that constitutional
habeas is a subsidiary procedural right for protecting constitutional rights, and
in particular the constitutional right not to be detained without due process of
law. This too reflects the core historical function of habeas: providing an
escape from detention for those who are detained without due process of law.
What has changed is not the core function of habeas, but the notion of due
process. Scalia embraces a rigid notion of the process that is due. We,
however, embrace a more flexible notion, one that takes due process to reflect
the appropriate balance between competing concerns. Given this notion, a
"bobtailed judicial inquiry" may be the best that can be offered a detainee. Yet
that option will do more to preserve the overall balance of constitutional rights
than Scalia's rigid position, which would either lead to dangerous terrorists
being released, or, more likely, unjustly deny constitutional protections to
nonresident aliens who live at the mercy of the U.S. government. Our argument
in Part IV, section C above convinces us that it is more important to protect this
extension of constitutional rights than to accept Scalia's crabbed originalism.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Bush administration is holding hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of
detainees for what seems likely to be a great length of time, presumably until
208. 542 U.S. at 564.
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the "war on terror" has been resolved. It categorizes these people as "enemy
combatants," thereby lumping together combatants whose lawful military acts
against the United States would be immunized by international law and
civilians whose hostile acts would have been illegal. And following the
Supreme Court's opinion in Hamdi, it has offered these detainees, at best (and
not when held by the CIA), only the inadequate legal process that is provided
in a CSRT hearing to determine whether they are indeed "enemy combatants."
We argue here that the Court should re-examine its holding in Hamdi.
That holding relied on a reading of international law, specifically the law of
war, and it got that law wrong. The law of war requires a distinction to be
made between combatants and civilians. That distinction is relevant to the
process each is due. Moreover, the process they are due is not merely an affair
of international law; they are due "due process" under the U.S. Constitution.
And the law of war dealing with international armed conflict is relevant as a
guide to the proper interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
Lastly, these rights can be enforced. They may be enforceable through the
appeal rights provided by the DTA. But if not, then they are enforceable
through habeas. The DTA and MCA have stripped nonresident aliens of their
statutory habeas rights but they cannot strip them of their constitutionally
guaranteed habeas rights. These are subsidiary procedural rights that ensure the
protection of their constitutional rights and in particular, their constitutional
right against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
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